| Titre : | Sabotage in tournaments : Evidence from a laboratory experiment (2011) |
| Auteurs : | Christine Harbring, Auteur ; Bernd Irlenbusch, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Management science (Vol. 57 N° 4, Avril 2011) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 611-627 |
| Note générale : | Management |
| Langues : | Anglais |
| Index. décimale : | 658 (Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce) |
| Tags : | Decision analysis Applications Organizational studies making Motivation Incentives |
| Résumé : | Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name "sabotage." Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. |
| DEWEY : | 658 |
| ISSN : | 0025-1909 |
| En ligne : | http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/611 |
