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Management science: a Journal of the institute for operations research and the management sciences |
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Ajouter le résultat dans votre panierSabotage in tournaments / Christine Harbring in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 611-627
Titre : Sabotage in tournaments : Evidence from a laboratory experiment Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Christine Harbring, Auteur ; Bernd Irlenbusch, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 611-627 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Decision analysis Applications Organizational studies Decision making Motivation Incentives Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name "sabotage." Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/611 [article] Sabotage in tournaments : Evidence from a laboratory experiment [texte imprimé] / Christine Harbring, Auteur ; Bernd Irlenbusch, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 611-627.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 611-627
Mots-clés : Decision analysis Applications Organizational studies Decision making Motivation Incentives Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name "sabotage." Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/611
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 628-646
Titre : Fund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Ping Hu, Auteur ; Jayant R. Kale, Auteur ; Marco Pagani, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 628-646 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Mutual funds Asset flows Relative risk Ability Career concerns Employment risk Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We develop a unified model of the interactions among investors, fund companies, and fund managers. We show that the interplay between a manager's incentives from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a nonmonotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and prior performance relative to her peers. Significantly outperforming (underperforming) managers are less (more) likely to be fired in the future and are also more likely to increase relative risk. Ceteris paribus, relative risk declines with the level of employment risk faced by a manager. Using a large sample of mutual fund managers, we find strong support for the hypothesized U-shaped relation between relative risk and prior performance. Our findings also highlight the importance of employment risk as the underlying driver of risk shifting by fund managers. Our theoretical model also generates additional hypotheses that link determinants of the fund flow–performance relation and managers' employment risk to their risk-taking behavior. In support, our empirical analysis shows that funds with higher expense ratios have less convex fund flow–performance relations and less convex U-shaped relations between relative risk and prior performance; funds with younger managers, who face greater employment risk, have more convex U-shaped relative risk–prior performance relations; and managers in larger fund families have lower incentives to engage in risk shifting, thereby leading to a less convex U-shaped relation. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/628 [article] Fund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking [texte imprimé] / Ping Hu, Auteur ; Jayant R. Kale, Auteur ; Marco Pagani, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 628-646.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 628-646
Mots-clés : Mutual funds Asset flows Relative risk Ability Career concerns Employment risk Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We develop a unified model of the interactions among investors, fund companies, and fund managers. We show that the interplay between a manager's incentives from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a nonmonotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and prior performance relative to her peers. Significantly outperforming (underperforming) managers are less (more) likely to be fired in the future and are also more likely to increase relative risk. Ceteris paribus, relative risk declines with the level of employment risk faced by a manager. Using a large sample of mutual fund managers, we find strong support for the hypothesized U-shaped relation between relative risk and prior performance. Our findings also highlight the importance of employment risk as the underlying driver of risk shifting by fund managers. Our theoretical model also generates additional hypotheses that link determinants of the fund flow–performance relation and managers' employment risk to their risk-taking behavior. In support, our empirical analysis shows that funds with higher expense ratios have less convex fund flow–performance relations and less convex U-shaped relations between relative risk and prior performance; funds with younger managers, who face greater employment risk, have more convex U-shaped relative risk–prior performance relations; and managers in larger fund families have lower incentives to engage in risk shifting, thereby leading to a less convex U-shaped relation. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/628
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 647-666
Titre : Integrated sequencing and scheduling in coil coating Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Wiebke Höhn, Auteur ; Felix G. König, Auteur ; Rolf H. Möhring, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 647-666 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Sequencing Scheduling Integrated steel production Coil coating 2-union graphs Independent set Branch-and-price Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We consider a complex planning problem in integrated steel production. A sequence of coils of sheet metal needs to be color coated in consecutive stages. Different coil geometries and changes of colors necessitate time-consuming setup work. In most coating stages one can choose between two parallel color tanks. This can either reduce the number of setups needed or enable setups concurrent with production. A production plan comprises the sequencing of coils and the scheduling of color tanks and setup work. The aim is to minimize the makespan for a given set of coils. We present an optimization model for this integrated sequencing and scheduling problem. A core component is a graph theoretical model for concurrent setup scheduling. It is instrumental for building a fast heuristic that is embedded into a genetic algorithm to solve the sequencing problem. The quality of our solutions is evaluated via an integer program based on a combinatorial relaxation, showing that our solutions are within 10% of the optimum. Our algorithm is implemented at Salzgitter Flachstahl GmbH, a major German steel producer. This has led to an average reduction in makespan by over 13% and has greatly exceeded expectations. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/647 [article] Integrated sequencing and scheduling in coil coating [texte imprimé] / Wiebke Höhn, Auteur ; Felix G. König, Auteur ; Rolf H. Möhring, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 647-666.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 647-666
Mots-clés : Sequencing Scheduling Integrated steel production Coil coating 2-union graphs Independent set Branch-and-price Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We consider a complex planning problem in integrated steel production. A sequence of coils of sheet metal needs to be color coated in consecutive stages. Different coil geometries and changes of colors necessitate time-consuming setup work. In most coating stages one can choose between two parallel color tanks. This can either reduce the number of setups needed or enable setups concurrent with production. A production plan comprises the sequencing of coils and the scheduling of color tanks and setup work. The aim is to minimize the makespan for a given set of coils. We present an optimization model for this integrated sequencing and scheduling problem. A core component is a graph theoretical model for concurrent setup scheduling. It is instrumental for building a fast heuristic that is embedded into a genetic algorithm to solve the sequencing problem. The quality of our solutions is evaluated via an integer program based on a combinatorial relaxation, showing that our solutions are within 10% of the optimum. Our algorithm is implemented at Salzgitter Flachstahl GmbH, a major German steel producer. This has led to an average reduction in makespan by over 13% and has greatly exceeded expectations. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/647
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 667-688
Titre : An experimental study of information revelation policies in sequential auctions Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Timothy N. Cason, Auteur ; Karthik N. Kannan, Auteur ; Ralph Siebert, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 667-688 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Complete and incomplete information revelation policies Laboratory study Procurement auction Multistage game Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identified a trade-off between the desire to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this trade-off, using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying information revelation policies. Specifically, the Complete Information Revelation Policy, where all submitted bids are revealed between auctions, is compared to the Incomplete Information Revelation Policy, where only the winning bid is revealed. The experimental results are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions. For example, bidders pool with other types to prevent an opponent from learning significantly more often under a Complete Information Revelation Policy. Also as predicted, the procurer pays less when employing an Incomplete Information Revelation Policy only when the market is highly competitive. Bids are usually more aggressive than the risk-neutral quantitative prediction, which is broadly consistent with risk aversion. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/667 [article] An experimental study of information revelation policies in sequential auctions [texte imprimé] / Timothy N. Cason, Auteur ; Karthik N. Kannan, Auteur ; Ralph Siebert, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 667-688.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 667-688
Mots-clés : Complete and incomplete information revelation policies Laboratory study Procurement auction Multistage game Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identified a trade-off between the desire to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this trade-off, using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying information revelation policies. Specifically, the Complete Information Revelation Policy, where all submitted bids are revealed between auctions, is compared to the Incomplete Information Revelation Policy, where only the winning bid is revealed. The experimental results are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions. For example, bidders pool with other types to prevent an opponent from learning significantly more often under a Complete Information Revelation Policy. Also as predicted, the procurer pays less when employing an Incomplete Information Revelation Policy only when the market is highly competitive. Bids are usually more aggressive than the risk-neutral quantitative prediction, which is broadly consistent with risk aversion. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/667
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 689-704
Titre : Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information : An experimental evaluation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Basak Kalkanci, Auteur ; Kay-Yut Chen, Auteur ; Feryal Erhun, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 689-704 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Behavioral operations management All-unit quantity discount contracts Price-only contracts Complex contracts Contract performance Supply chain efficiency Asymmetric demand information Experience-weighted attraction learning model Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. The goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal. We study a two-tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments. In the experiments, the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end-consumer demand than the human supplier. The supplier offers either a quantity discount contract (with two or three price blocks) or a price-only contract, contracts that are commonplace in practice, yet different in complexity. Results show that, contrary to theoretical predictions, quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier's profits. We also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts. These observations can be described with three decision biases (the probabilistic choice bias, the reinforcement bias, and the memory bias) and can be modeled using the experience-weighted attraction learning model. Our results demonstrate that simpler contracts, such as a price-only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks, are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/689 [article] Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information : An experimental evaluation [texte imprimé] / Basak Kalkanci, Auteur ; Kay-Yut Chen, Auteur ; Feryal Erhun, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 689-704.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 689-704
Mots-clés : Behavioral operations management All-unit quantity discount contracts Price-only contracts Complex contracts Contract performance Supply chain efficiency Asymmetric demand information Experience-weighted attraction learning model Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. The goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal. We study a two-tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments. In the experiments, the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end-consumer demand than the human supplier. The supplier offers either a quantity discount contract (with two or three price blocks) or a price-only contract, contracts that are commonplace in practice, yet different in complexity. Results show that, contrary to theoretical predictions, quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier's profits. We also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts. These observations can be described with three decision biases (the probabilistic choice bias, the reinforcement bias, and the memory bias) and can be modeled using the experience-weighted attraction learning model. Our results demonstrate that simpler contracts, such as a price-only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks, are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/689
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 705-712
Titre : Generating ambiguity in the laboratory Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Jack Stecher, Auteur ; Timothy Shields, Auteur ; John Dickhaut, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 705-712 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Ambiguity Ellsberg Knightian uncertainty Laboratory experiments Decision analysis Theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This article develops a method for drawing samples from a distribution with no finite quantiles or moments. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects, essentially because it is impossible for the experimenter. We characterize our method, illustrate it in simulations, and then test it in a laboratory experiment. Our method does not withhold sampling information, does not assume that the subject is incapable of making statistical inferences, is replicable across experiments, and requires no special apparatus. We compare our method to the techniques used in related experiments that attempt to produce an ambiguous experience for the subjects. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/705 [article] Generating ambiguity in the laboratory [texte imprimé] / Jack Stecher, Auteur ; Timothy Shields, Auteur ; John Dickhaut, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 705-712.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 705-712
Mots-clés : Ambiguity Ellsberg Knightian uncertainty Laboratory experiments Decision analysis Theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This article develops a method for drawing samples from a distribution with no finite quantiles or moments. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects, essentially because it is impossible for the experimenter. We characterize our method, illustrate it in simulations, and then test it in a laboratory experiment. Our method does not withhold sampling information, does not assume that the subject is incapable of making statistical inferences, is replicable across experiments, and requires no special apparatus. We compare our method to the techniques used in related experiments that attempt to produce an ambiguous experience for the subjects. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/705
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 713-726
Titre : Buying from the babbling retailer? : The impact of availability information on customer behavior Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gad Allon, Auteur ; Achal Bassamboo, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 713-726 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Inventory Cheap talk Revenue management Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Provision of real-time information by a firm to its customers has become prevalent in recent years in both the service and retail sectors. In this paper, we study a retail operations model where customers are strategic in both their actions and in the way they interpret information, whereas the retailer is strategic in the way it provides information. This paper focuses on the ability (or the lack thereof) to communicate unverifiable information and influence customers' actions. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study this type of communication and discuss the equilibrium language emerging between the retailer and its customers. We show that for a single retailer and homogeneous customer population setting, the equilibrium language that emerges carries no information. In this sense, a single retailer providing information on its own cannot create any credibility with the customers. We study how the results are impacted due to the heterogeneity of the customers. We provide conditions under which the firm may be able to influence the customer behavior. In particular, we show that the customers' willingness to pay and willingness to wait cannot be ranked in an opposite manner. However, even when the firm can influence each customer class separately, the effective demand is not impacted. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/713 [article] Buying from the babbling retailer? : The impact of availability information on customer behavior [texte imprimé] / Gad Allon, Auteur ; Achal Bassamboo, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 713-726.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 713-726
Mots-clés : Inventory Cheap talk Revenue management Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Provision of real-time information by a firm to its customers has become prevalent in recent years in both the service and retail sectors. In this paper, we study a retail operations model where customers are strategic in both their actions and in the way they interpret information, whereas the retailer is strategic in the way it provides information. This paper focuses on the ability (or the lack thereof) to communicate unverifiable information and influence customers' actions. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study this type of communication and discuss the equilibrium language emerging between the retailer and its customers. We show that for a single retailer and homogeneous customer population setting, the equilibrium language that emerges carries no information. In this sense, a single retailer providing information on its own cannot create any credibility with the customers. We study how the results are impacted due to the heterogeneity of the customers. We provide conditions under which the firm may be able to influence the customer behavior. In particular, we show that the customers' willingness to pay and willingness to wait cannot be ranked in an opposite manner. However, even when the firm can influence each customer class separately, the effective demand is not impacted. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/713
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 727-740
Titre : How does a retailer's service plan affect a manufacturer's warranty? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Bo Jiang, Auteur ; Xubing Zhang, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 727-740 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Service plans Warranty Signaling Distribution channels Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A service plan is a type of optional warranty beyond manufacturers' base warranties that retailers offer to consumers. In this paper, we examine how a service plan affects the role played by a manufacturer's base warranty. Analysis shows that when consumers can assess product quality (i.e., the probability of product failure), the manufacturer's warranty is negatively affected by the presence of a service plan. In the presence of such a plan, a base warranty is offered only when the manufacturer is very cost-efficient in providing a warranty relative to the retailer. In this case, although the double-marginalization problem is aggravated, offering a (limited) base warranty reduces the total warranty cost in the channel and provokes the retailer into enlarging the service plan coverage. When consumers cannot assess product quality, a high-quality manufacturer is motivated to offer a base warranty to signal its quality. In the presence of a service plan, however, a very cost-efficient manufacturer is discouraged from doing so. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/727 [article] How does a retailer's service plan affect a manufacturer's warranty? [texte imprimé] / Bo Jiang, Auteur ; Xubing Zhang, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 727-740.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 727-740
Mots-clés : Service plans Warranty Signaling Distribution channels Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A service plan is a type of optional warranty beyond manufacturers' base warranties that retailers offer to consumers. In this paper, we examine how a service plan affects the role played by a manufacturer's base warranty. Analysis shows that when consumers can assess product quality (i.e., the probability of product failure), the manufacturer's warranty is negatively affected by the presence of a service plan. In the presence of such a plan, a base warranty is offered only when the manufacturer is very cost-efficient in providing a warranty relative to the retailer. In this case, although the double-marginalization problem is aggravated, offering a (limited) base warranty reduces the total warranty cost in the channel and provokes the retailer into enlarging the service plan coverage. When consumers cannot assess product quality, a high-quality manufacturer is motivated to offer a base warranty to signal its quality. In the presence of a service plan, however, a very cost-efficient manufacturer is discouraged from doing so. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/727
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 741-751
Titre : The benefits of competitive upward channel decentralization Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Yunchuan Liu, Auteur ; Rajeev K. Tyagi, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 741-751 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Upward channel decentralization Production outsourcing Product positioning Distribution channel Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Upward channel decentralization occurs when firms choose to not manufacture products by themselves and procure products from upstream suppliers. Current voices from marketing scholars and practitioners have predominantly focused on the cost benefits when production is outsourced to lower-cost upstream suppliers. In this paper, we study the effects of upward channel decentralization where competing firms can outsource their production to upstream suppliers who do not have any advantages on production costs. We show how downstream firms can still benefit from upward channel decentralization provided their product positioning is endogenous. Thus, we provide a new theory on the strategic benefits of upward channel decentralization. We also use this framework to show a new benefit to manufacturers selling through downstream retailers rather than directly. We examine the implications of our theory for consumer and social welfare, and also draw managerial implications. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/741 [article] The benefits of competitive upward channel decentralization [texte imprimé] / Yunchuan Liu, Auteur ; Rajeev K. Tyagi, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 741-751.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 741-751
Mots-clés : Upward channel decentralization Production outsourcing Product positioning Distribution channel Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Upward channel decentralization occurs when firms choose to not manufacture products by themselves and procure products from upstream suppliers. Current voices from marketing scholars and practitioners have predominantly focused on the cost benefits when production is outsourced to lower-cost upstream suppliers. In this paper, we study the effects of upward channel decentralization where competing firms can outsource their production to upstream suppliers who do not have any advantages on production costs. We show how downstream firms can still benefit from upward channel decentralization provided their product positioning is endogenous. Thus, we provide a new theory on the strategic benefits of upward channel decentralization. We also use this framework to show a new benefit to manufacturers selling through downstream retailers rather than directly. We examine the implications of our theory for consumer and social welfare, and also draw managerial implications. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/741
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 752-762
Titre : Comarketing alliances : Should you contract on actions or outcomes? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Pavan Rao Chennamaneni, Auteur ; Ramarao Desiraju, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 752-762 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Comarketing alliances Marketing externality Information asymmetry Input versus output monitoring Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Comarketing alliances often involve multiple partners, and a given partner's marketing efforts on behalf of the alliance can indirectly affect the demand of the other partners. Individual partners, however, can ignore the effects of such an externality and invest suboptimally to the detriment of the alliance. This paper examines the relative effectiveness of outcome- and action-based contracts in providing the alliance partners with the incentives to invest appropriately. We develop a mathematical model in which a focal firm (e.g., Sony) contracts with two partners (e.g., McDonald's and Old Navy) when each of these partners is privately informed about the impact of the alliance on its demand. Our analysis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of outcome- (or output-) and action-based (or input-based) contracts in settings with varying levels of the demand externality. We find that when there is either no externality or a relatively weak positive externality, there is a strict preference for output-based contracts; that preference, however, is reversed with a sufficiently strong positive externality. This paper explains the underlying rationale for these findings. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/752 [article] Comarketing alliances : Should you contract on actions or outcomes? [texte imprimé] / Pavan Rao Chennamaneni, Auteur ; Ramarao Desiraju, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 752-762.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 752-762
Mots-clés : Comarketing alliances Marketing externality Information asymmetry Input versus output monitoring Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Comarketing alliances often involve multiple partners, and a given partner's marketing efforts on behalf of the alliance can indirectly affect the demand of the other partners. Individual partners, however, can ignore the effects of such an externality and invest suboptimally to the detriment of the alliance. This paper examines the relative effectiveness of outcome- and action-based contracts in providing the alliance partners with the incentives to invest appropriately. We develop a mathematical model in which a focal firm (e.g., Sony) contracts with two partners (e.g., McDonald's and Old Navy) when each of these partners is privately informed about the impact of the alliance on its demand. Our analysis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of outcome- (or output-) and action-based (or input-based) contracts in settings with varying levels of the demand externality. We find that when there is either no externality or a relatively weak positive externality, there is a strict preference for output-based contracts; that preference, however, is reversed with a sufficiently strong positive externality. This paper explains the underlying rationale for these findings. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/752
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777
Titre : Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 763-777 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Capacity Competition Uncertainty Investment timing Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763 [article] Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets [texte imprimé] / Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 763-777.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777
Mots-clés : Capacity Competition Uncertainty Investment timing Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 778-795
Titre : The value of fast fashion : Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Robert Swinney, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 778-795 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Strategic consumer behavior Quick response Fast fashion Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design "hot" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on "strategic" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/778 [article] The value of fast fashion : Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior [texte imprimé] / Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Robert Swinney, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 778-795.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 778-795
Mots-clés : Strategic consumer behavior Quick response Fast fashion Game theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design "hot" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on "strategic" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/778
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