[article] 
inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) . - pp. 1687-1701

Titre :	An experimental test of advice and social learning
Type de document :	texte imprimé
Auteurs :	Bogaçhan Çelen, Auteur ; Shachar Kariv, Auteur ; Andrew Schotter, Auteur
Année de publication :	2010
Article en page(s) :	pp. 1687-1701
Note générale :	Management
Langues :	Anglais (eng)
Mots-clés :	Experiment Naïve advice Social learning Word-of-mouth
Index. décimale :	658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce
Résumé :	Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others but also from seeking advice. This paper introduces advice giving into the standard social-learning experiment of Çelen and Kariv (Çelen, B., S. Kariv. 2005. An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information. Econom. Theory 26(3) 677–699). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information—action and advice—are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects' welfare.
DEWEY :	658
ISSN :	0025-1909
En ligne :	http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/10/1687

[article] An experimental test of advice and social learning [texte imprimé] / Bogaçhan Çelen, Auteur ; Shachar Kariv, Auteur ; Andrew Schotter, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1687-1701.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) . - pp. 1687-1701

Mots-clés :	Experiment Naïve advice Social learning Word-of-mouth
Index. décimale :	658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce
Résumé :	Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others but also from seeking advice. This paper introduces advice giving into the standard social-learning experiment of Çelen and Kariv (Çelen, B., S. Kariv. 2005. An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information. Econom. Theory 26(3) 677–699). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information—action and advice—are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects' welfare.
DEWEY :	658
ISSN :	0025-1909
En ligne :	http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/10/1687