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Management science: a Journal of the institute for operations research and the management sciences |
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Ajouter le résultat dans votre panierSplit or steal? cooperative behavior when the stakes are large / Martijn J. Van Den Assem in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 2-20
Titre : Split or steal? cooperative behavior when the stakes are large Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Martijn J. Van Den Assem, Auteur ; Dennie Van Dolder, Auteur ; Richard H. Thaler, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 2-20 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Natural experiment Game show Prisoner's dilemma Cooperation Cooperative behavior Social behavior Social preferences Reciprocity Reciprocal behavior Context effects Anchoring Résumé : We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show Golden Balls. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly cooperative as their age increases. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/2.abstract [article] Split or steal? cooperative behavior when the stakes are large [texte imprimé] / Martijn J. Van Den Assem, Auteur ; Dennie Van Dolder, Auteur ; Richard H. Thaler, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 2-20.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 2-20
Mots-clés : Natural experiment Game show Prisoner's dilemma Cooperation Cooperative behavior Social behavior Social preferences Reciprocity Reciprocal behavior Context effects Anchoring Résumé : We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show Golden Balls. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly cooperative as their age increases. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/2.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 21-34
Titre : The behavioral genetics of behavioral anomalies Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : David Cesarini, Auteur ; Magnus Johannesson, Auteur ; Patrik K. E. Magnusson, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 21-34 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Behavioral anomalies Behavior genetics Heuristics and biases Résumé : A number of recent papers have examined the environmental and genetic sources of individual differences in economic and financial decision making. Here we contribute to this burgeoning literature by extending it to a number of key behavioral anomalies that are thought to be of importance for consumption, savings, and portfolio selection decisions. Using survey-based evidence from more than 11,000 Swedish twins, we demonstrate that a number of anomalies such as, for instance, the conjunction fallacy, default bias, and loss aversion are moderately heritable. In contrast, our estimates imply that variation in common environment explains only a small share of individual differences. We also report suggestive evidence in favor of a shared genetic architecture between cognitive reflection and a subset of the studied anomalies. These results offer some support for the proposition that the heritable variation in behavioral anomalies is partly mediated by genetic variance in cognitive ability. Taken together with previous findings, our results underline the importance of genetic differences as a source of heterogeneity in economic and financial decision making. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/21.abstract [article] The behavioral genetics of behavioral anomalies [texte imprimé] / David Cesarini, Auteur ; Magnus Johannesson, Auteur ; Patrik K. E. Magnusson, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 21-34.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 21-34
Mots-clés : Behavioral anomalies Behavior genetics Heuristics and biases Résumé : A number of recent papers have examined the environmental and genetic sources of individual differences in economic and financial decision making. Here we contribute to this burgeoning literature by extending it to a number of key behavioral anomalies that are thought to be of importance for consumption, savings, and portfolio selection decisions. Using survey-based evidence from more than 11,000 Swedish twins, we demonstrate that a number of anomalies such as, for instance, the conjunction fallacy, default bias, and loss aversion are moderately heritable. In contrast, our estimates imply that variation in common environment explains only a small share of individual differences. We also report suggestive evidence in favor of a shared genetic architecture between cognitive reflection and a subset of the studied anomalies. These results offer some support for the proposition that the heritable variation in behavioral anomalies is partly mediated by genetic variance in cognitive ability. Taken together with previous findings, our results underline the importance of genetic differences as a source of heterogeneity in economic and financial decision making. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/21.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 35-51
Titre : A model of casino gambling Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Nicholas Barberis, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 35-51 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Gambling Prospect theory Time inconsistency Probability weighting Résumé : We show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling, one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior. First, we demonstrate that for a wide range of preference parameter values, a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino offers only bets with no skewness and with zero or negative expected value. Second, we show that the probability weighting embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency: at the moment he enters a casino, the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy; but after he starts playing, he wants to switch to a different strategy. The model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior: how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency; and, if he is aware of it, on whether he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/35.abstract [article] A model of casino gambling [texte imprimé] / Nicholas Barberis, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 35-51.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 35-51
Mots-clés : Gambling Prospect theory Time inconsistency Probability weighting Résumé : We show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling, one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior. First, we demonstrate that for a wide range of preference parameter values, a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino offers only bets with no skewness and with zero or negative expected value. Second, we show that the probability weighting embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency: at the moment he enters a casino, the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy; but after he starts playing, he wants to switch to a different strategy. The model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior: how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency; and, if he is aware of it, on whether he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/35.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 52-61
Titre : The impact of personal experience on behavior : Evidence from video-rental fines Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Michael P. Haselhuhn, Auteur ; Devin G. Pope, Auteur ; Maurice E. Schweitzer, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 52-61 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Behavioral economics Decision making Backward-looking behavior Decisions following descriptions versus experience Learning Résumé : Personal experience matters. In a field setting with longitudinal data, we disentangle the effects of learning new information from the effects of personal experience. We demonstrate that experience with a fine, controlling for the effect of learning new information, significantly boosts future compliance. We also show that experience with a large fine boosts compliance more than experience with a small fine, but that the influence of experience with both large and small fines decays sharply over time. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/52.abstract [article] The impact of personal experience on behavior : Evidence from video-rental fines [texte imprimé] / Michael P. Haselhuhn, Auteur ; Devin G. Pope, Auteur ; Maurice E. Schweitzer, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 52-61.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 52-61
Mots-clés : Behavioral economics Decision making Backward-looking behavior Decisions following descriptions versus experience Learning Résumé : Personal experience matters. In a field setting with longitudinal data, we disentangle the effects of learning new information from the effects of personal experience. We demonstrate that experience with a fine, controlling for the effect of learning new information, significantly boosts future compliance. We also show that experience with a large fine boosts compliance more than experience with a small fine, but that the influence of experience with both large and small fines decays sharply over time. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/52.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 62-77
Titre : Norms and contracting Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Judd B. Kessler, Auteur ; Stephen Leider, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 62-77 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Experiment Norms Incomplete contracts Résumé : We argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms. In a laboratory experiment, we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four games, and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable “handshake” agreement to take the first-best action. In three games, a contract with only this handshake agreement is (at least weakly) optimal. The handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements. Our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness: establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/62.abstract [article] Norms and contracting [texte imprimé] / Judd B. Kessler, Auteur ; Stephen Leider, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 62-77.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 62-77
Mots-clés : Experiment Norms Incomplete contracts Résumé : We argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms. In a laboratory experiment, we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four games, and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable “handshake” agreement to take the first-best action. In three games, a contract with only this handshake agreement is (at least weakly) optimal. The handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements. Our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness: establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/62.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 78-93
Titre : The Impact of Gender Composition on Team Performance and Decision Making : Evidence from the Field Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Jose Apesteguia, Auteur ; Ghazala Azmat, Auteur ; Nagore Iriberri, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 78-93 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Gender Teams Performance Decision making Résumé : We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affects their economic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups of three, in which each group takes the role of a general manager. There are two parallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involving MBA students. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women are significantly outperformed by all other gender combinations, both at the undergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performance distribution, we find that for undergraduates, three-women teams are outperformed throughout, but by as much as 0.47 of a standard deviation of the mean at the bottom and by only 0.09 at the top. For MBA students, at the top, the best performing group is two men and one woman. The differences in performance are explained by differences in decision making. We observe that three-women teams are less aggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in research and development, and invest more in social sustainability initiatives than does any other gender combination. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/78.abstract [article] The Impact of Gender Composition on Team Performance and Decision Making : Evidence from the Field [texte imprimé] / Jose Apesteguia, Auteur ; Ghazala Azmat, Auteur ; Nagore Iriberri, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 78-93.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 78-93
Mots-clés : Gender Teams Performance Decision making Résumé : We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affects their economic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups of three, in which each group takes the role of a general manager. There are two parallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involving MBA students. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women are significantly outperformed by all other gender combinations, both at the undergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performance distribution, we find that for undergraduates, three-women teams are outperformed throughout, but by as much as 0.47 of a standard deviation of the mean at the bottom and by only 0.09 at the top. For MBA students, at the top, the best performing group is two men and one woman. The differences in performance are explained by differences in decision making. We observe that three-women teams are less aggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in research and development, and invest more in social sustainability initiatives than does any other gender combination. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/78.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 94-113
Titre : Feedback, self-esteem, and performance in organizations Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Camelia M. Kuhnen, Auteur ; Agnieszka Tymula, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 94-113 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Organizational studies Personnel Motivation-incentives Productivity Résumé : We examine whether private feedback about relative performance can mitigate moral hazard in competitive environments by modifying the agents' self-esteem. In our experimental setting, people work harder and expect to rank better when told that they may learn their ranking, relative to cases when feedback will not be provided. Individuals who ranked better than expected decrease output but expect a better rank in the future, whereas those who ranked worse than expected increase output but lower their future rank expectations. Feedback helps create a ratcheting effect in productivity, mainly because of the fight for dominance at the top of the rank hierarchy. Our findings suggest that organizations can improve employee productivity by changing the likelihood of feedback, the reference group used to calculate relative performance, and the informativeness of the feedback message. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/94.abstract [article] Feedback, self-esteem, and performance in organizations [texte imprimé] / Camelia M. Kuhnen, Auteur ; Agnieszka Tymula, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 94-113.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 94-113
Mots-clés : Organizational studies Personnel Motivation-incentives Productivity Résumé : We examine whether private feedback about relative performance can mitigate moral hazard in competitive environments by modifying the agents' self-esteem. In our experimental setting, people work harder and expect to rank better when told that they may learn their ranking, relative to cases when feedback will not be provided. Individuals who ranked better than expected decrease output but expect a better rank in the future, whereas those who ranked worse than expected increase output but lower their future rank expectations. Feedback helps create a ratcheting effect in productivity, mainly because of the fight for dominance at the top of the rank hierarchy. Our findings suggest that organizations can improve employee productivity by changing the likelihood of feedback, the reference group used to calculate relative performance, and the informativeness of the feedback message. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/94.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 114-122
Titre : Gender, competition, and managerial decisions Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Curtis R. Price, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 114-122 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Decision analysis Labor market Discrimination Gender differences Experiment Résumé : The purpose of this study is to investigate the use of competitive compensation between a manager and a worker in the laboratory. To this end, we impose a simple agency relationship between two groups of subjects termed managers and workers. The manager chooses a compensation scheme for the worker from either a piece rate or a tournament payment scheme and is paid based on the workers performance in the task. The results indicate that when given information about worker ability, male managers choose the tournament significantly less often for a female worker. On the other hand, when no information about worker ability is given to the manager, there is no difference in compensation choice for the worker, although male and female managers differ significantly in their own preferences for compensation scheme. We conjecture that these results are tied to the fact that there is a measurable stereotype that females are worse at the task relative to males, although further research is needed in this regard. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/114.abstract [article] Gender, competition, and managerial decisions [texte imprimé] / Curtis R. Price, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 114-122.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 114-122
Mots-clés : Decision analysis Labor market Discrimination Gender differences Experiment Résumé : The purpose of this study is to investigate the use of competitive compensation between a manager and a worker in the laboratory. To this end, we impose a simple agency relationship between two groups of subjects termed managers and workers. The manager chooses a compensation scheme for the worker from either a piece rate or a tournament payment scheme and is paid based on the workers performance in the task. The results indicate that when given information about worker ability, male managers choose the tournament significantly less often for a female worker. On the other hand, when no information about worker ability is given to the manager, there is no difference in compensation choice for the worker, although male and female managers differ significantly in their own preferences for compensation scheme. We conjecture that these results are tied to the fact that there is a measurable stereotype that females are worse at the task relative to males, although further research is needed in this regard. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/114.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 123-140
Titre : Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets : Effects of trading mechanism and information distribution Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Lian Jian, Auteur ; Rahul Sami, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 123-140 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Prediction markets Experiments Market scoring rule Résumé : We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trade. In comparing two commonly used mechanisms, we find no significant difference between the performance of the direct probability-report form and the indirect security-trading form of the market scoring rule. In the case of the markets with a structured order, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that information aggregation is slower when information is complementary. In structured markets, the theoretical prediction that there will be more delayed trading in complementary markets is supported, but we find no support for the prediction that there will be more bluffing in complementary markets. However, the theoretical predictions are not borne out in the unstructured markets. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/123.abstract [article] Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets : Effects of trading mechanism and information distribution [texte imprimé] / Lian Jian, Auteur ; Rahul Sami, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 123-140.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 123-140
Mots-clés : Prediction markets Experiments Market scoring rule Résumé : We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trade. In comparing two commonly used mechanisms, we find no significant difference between the performance of the direct probability-report form and the indirect security-trading form of the market scoring rule. In the case of the markets with a structured order, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that information aggregation is slower when information is complementary. In structured markets, the theoretical prediction that there will be more delayed trading in complementary markets is supported, but we find no support for the prediction that there will be more bluffing in complementary markets. However, the theoretical predictions are not borne out in the unstructured markets. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/123.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 141-158
Titre : Apologies as signals : With evidence from a trust game Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Benjamin Ho, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 141-158 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Apologies Remorse Signaling Trust game Attribution theory Résumé : Apologies are part of a social institution designed to restore frayed relationships not only in daily life but also in the domains of corporate governance, medical malpractice litigation, political reputation, organizational culture, etc. The theory shows that in a general class of moral hazard games with imperfect information about agents with two-dimensional type, apologies exhibit regular properties—e.g., apologies are more frequent in long relationships, early in relationships, and between better-matched partners. A variant of the trust game demonstrates that communication matters in a manner consistent with economic theory; specifically, the words “I am sorry” appear to select equilibrium behavior consistent with the theory's main predictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/141.abstract [article] Apologies as signals : With evidence from a trust game [texte imprimé] / Benjamin Ho, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 141-158.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 141-158
Mots-clés : Apologies Remorse Signaling Trust game Attribution theory Résumé : Apologies are part of a social institution designed to restore frayed relationships not only in daily life but also in the domains of corporate governance, medical malpractice litigation, political reputation, organizational culture, etc. The theory shows that in a general class of moral hazard games with imperfect information about agents with two-dimensional type, apologies exhibit regular properties—e.g., apologies are more frequent in long relationships, early in relationships, and between better-matched partners. A variant of the trust game demonstrates that communication matters in a manner consistent with economic theory; specifically, the words “I am sorry” appear to select equilibrium behavior consistent with the theory's main predictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/141.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 159-178
Titre : A case-based model of probability and pricing judgments : Biases in buying and selling uncertainty Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Lyle A. Brenner, Auteur ; Dale W. Griffin, Auteur ; Derek J. Koehler, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 159-178 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Probability Finance Asset pricing Decision analysis Prospect theory Value function Forecasting Résumé : We integrate a case-based model of probability judgment with prospect theory to explore asset pricing under uncertainty. Research within the “heuristics and biases” tradition suggests that probability judgments respond primarily to case-specific evidence and disregard aggregate characteristics of the class to which the case belongs, resulting in predictable biases. The dual-system framework presented here distinguishes heuristic assessments of value and evidence strength from deliberative assessments that incorporate prior odds and likelihood ratios following Bayes' rule. Hypotheses are derived regarding the relative sensitivity of judged probabilities, buying prices, and selling prices to case- versus class-based evidence. We test these hypotheses using a simulated stock market in which participants can learn from experience and have incentives for accuracy. Valuation of uncertain assets is found to be largely case based even in this economic setting; however, consistent with the framework's predictions, distinct patterns of miscalibration are found for buying prices, selling prices, and probability judgments. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/159.abstract [article] A case-based model of probability and pricing judgments : Biases in buying and selling uncertainty [texte imprimé] / Lyle A. Brenner, Auteur ; Dale W. Griffin, Auteur ; Derek J. Koehler, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 159-178.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 159-178
Mots-clés : Probability Finance Asset pricing Decision analysis Prospect theory Value function Forecasting Résumé : We integrate a case-based model of probability judgment with prospect theory to explore asset pricing under uncertainty. Research within the “heuristics and biases” tradition suggests that probability judgments respond primarily to case-specific evidence and disregard aggregate characteristics of the class to which the case belongs, resulting in predictable biases. The dual-system framework presented here distinguishes heuristic assessments of value and evidence strength from deliberative assessments that incorporate prior odds and likelihood ratios following Bayes' rule. Hypotheses are derived regarding the relative sensitivity of judged probabilities, buying prices, and selling prices to case- versus class-based evidence. We test these hypotheses using a simulated stock market in which participants can learn from experience and have incentives for accuracy. Valuation of uncertain assets is found to be largely case based even in this economic setting; however, consistent with the framework's predictions, distinct patterns of miscalibration are found for buying prices, selling prices, and probability judgments. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/159.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 179-187
Titre : Paying to be nice : Consistency and costly prosocial behavior Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Ayelet Gneezy, Auteur ; Alex Imas, Auteur ; Amber Brown, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 179-187 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Charitable giving Moral consistency Licensing Field experiment Résumé : Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one's prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent and may even show the reductions in prosocial behavior associated with licensing. The results of a laboratory experiment and a large field experiment converge to support our account. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/179.abstract [article] Paying to be nice : Consistency and costly prosocial behavior [texte imprimé] / Ayelet Gneezy, Auteur ; Alex Imas, Auteur ; Amber Brown, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 179-187.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 179-187
Mots-clés : Charitable giving Moral consistency Licensing Field experiment Résumé : Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one's prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent and may even show the reductions in prosocial behavior associated with licensing. The results of a laboratory experiment and a large field experiment converge to support our account. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/179.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 188-202
Titre : Imprecise data sets as a source of ambiguity : A model and experimental evidence Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Ayala Arad, Auteur ; Gabrielle Gayer, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 188-202 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Decision analysis Theory Inference Uncertainty Résumé : In many circumstances, evaluations are based on empirical data. However, some observations may be imprecise, meaning that it is not entirely clear what occurred in them. We address the question of how beliefs are formed in these situations. The individual in our model is essentially a “frequentist.” He first makes a subjective judgment about the occurrence of the event for each imprecise observation. This may be any number between zero and one. He then evaluates the event by its “subjective” frequency of occurrence. Our model connects the method of processing imprecise observations with the individual's attitude toward ambiguity. An individual who in imprecise observations puts low (high) weight on the possibility that an event occurred is ambiguity averse (loving). An experiment supports the main assertions of the model: with precise data, subjects behave as if there were no ambiguity, whereas with imprecise data subjects turn out to be ambiguity averse. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/188.abstract [article] Imprecise data sets as a source of ambiguity : A model and experimental evidence [texte imprimé] / Ayala Arad, Auteur ; Gabrielle Gayer, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 188-202.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 188-202
Mots-clés : Decision analysis Theory Inference Uncertainty Résumé : In many circumstances, evaluations are based on empirical data. However, some observations may be imprecise, meaning that it is not entirely clear what occurred in them. We address the question of how beliefs are formed in these situations. The individual in our model is essentially a “frequentist.” He first makes a subjective judgment about the occurrence of the event for each imprecise observation. This may be any number between zero and one. He then evaluates the event by its “subjective” frequency of occurrence. Our model connects the method of processing imprecise observations with the individual's attitude toward ambiguity. An individual who in imprecise observations puts low (high) weight on the possibility that an event occurred is ambiguity averse (loving). An experiment supports the main assertions of the model: with precise data, subjects behave as if there were no ambiguity, whereas with imprecise data subjects turn out to be ambiguity averse. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/188.abstract
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 203-217
Titre : A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy : Evidence from the financial services industry Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Stephen V. Burks, Auteur ; Erin L. Krupka, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 203-217 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Ethics Norms Vignette Survey Coordination game Incentive compatible Financial services Financial adviser Whistle-blowing Fiduciary responsibility Organizational fit Résumé : We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/203.abstract [article] A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy : Evidence from the financial services industry [texte imprimé] / Stephen V. Burks, Auteur ; Erin L. Krupka, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 203-217.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 203-217
Mots-clés : Ethics Norms Vignette Survey Coordination game Incentive compatible Financial services Financial adviser Whistle-blowing Fiduciary responsibility Organizational fit Résumé : We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/203.abstract
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