| Titre : | The optimal quantity discount that a supplier should offer (2012) |
| Auteurs : | G. Y. Ke, Auteur ; J. H. Bookbinder, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Journal of the operational research society (JORS) (Vol. 63 N° 3, Mars 2012) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 354–367 |
| Note générale : | Recherche opérationnelle |
| Langues : | Anglais |
| Index. décimale : | 001.424 |
| Tags : | Coordination Quantity discount Price elasticity of demand Game theory Multiobjective decision making |
| Résumé : | Quantity discounts are a useful mechanism for coordination. Here we investigate such discounts from the supplier's perspective, both from a non-cooperative game-theoretical approach and a joint decision model. Taking into account the price elasticity of demand, this analysis aids a sole supplier in establishing an all-unit quantity discount policy in light of the buyer's best reaction. The Stackelberg equilibrium and Pareto optimal solution set are derived for the non-cooperative and joint-decision cases, respectively. Our research indicates that channel efficiency can be improved significantly if the quantity discount decision is made jointly rather than non-cooperatively. Moreover, we extend our model in three directions: (1) the product is transported by a private fleet; (2) the buyer may choose to offer her customers a different percentage discount than that she obtained from the supplier; and (3) the case of heterogeneous buyers. Numerical case studies are employed throughout the paper to illustrate the practical applications of the models presented and the sensitivity to model parameters. |
| DEWEY : | 001.424 |
| ISSN : | 0160-5682 |
| En ligne : | http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n3/abs/jors201135a.html |
