Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Contracting in supply chains / Elena Katok in Management science, Vol. 55 N° 12 (Décembre 2009) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 55 N° 12 (Décembre 2009) . - pp. 1953-1968 Titre : Contracting in supply chains : a laboratory investigation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Elena Katok, Auteur ; Diana Yan Wu, Auteur Article en page(s) : pp. 1953-1968 Note générale : Gestion Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply  chain  contracts  Experimental  economics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem, the supplier has no capacity constraints, and delivery occurs instantaneously. We compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier. Results indicate that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract, the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts. We also find that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent, they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/12/1953?maxtoshow=&hit [...] [article] Contracting in supply chains : a laboratory investigation [texte imprimé] / Elena Katok, Auteur ; Diana Yan Wu, Auteur . - pp. 1953-1968. Gestion Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 55 N° 12 (Décembre 2009) . - pp. 1953-1968 Mots-clés : Supply  chain  contracts  Experimental  economics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem, the supplier has no capacity constraints, and delivery occurs instantaneously. We compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier. Results indicate that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract, the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts. We also find that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent, they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/12/1953?maxtoshow=&hit [...]

Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? / Andrew M. Davis in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 177-192 Titre : Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Andrew M. Davis, Auteur ; Elena Katok, Auteur ; Anthony M. Kwasnica, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 177-192 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Reserve  prices  Procurement  auctions  Behavioral  operations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We investigate how auctioneers set reserve prices in auctions. A well-established theoretical result, assuming risk neutrality of the seller, is that the optimal reserve price should not depend on the number of participating bidders. In a set of controlled laboratory experiments, we find that seller behavior often deviates from the theoretical benchmarks. We extend the existing theory to explore three alternative explanations for our results: risk aversion, anticipated regret, and probability weighting. After fitting our data to each of these models through parameter estimation techniques on both an aggregate and individual level, we find that all three models are consistent with some of the characteristics of our data, but that the regret model provides a slightly more favorable fit overall. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/177 [article] Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? [texte imprimé] / Andrew M. Davis, Auteur ; Elena Katok, Auteur ; Anthony M. Kwasnica, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 177-192. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 177-192 Mots-clés : Reserve  prices  Procurement  auctions  Behavioral  operations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We investigate how auctioneers set reserve prices in auctions. A well-established theoretical result, assuming risk neutrality of the seller, is that the optimal reserve price should not depend on the number of participating bidders. In a set of controlled laboratory experiments, we find that seller behavior often deviates from the theoretical benchmarks. We extend the existing theory to explore three alternative explanations for our results: risk aversion, anticipated regret, and probability weighting. After fitting our data to each of these models through parameter estimation techniques on both an aggregate and individual level, we find that all three models are consistent with some of the characteristics of our data, but that the regret model provides a slightly more favorable fit overall. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/177

When does it pay to delay supplier qualification? / Zhixi Wan in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) . - pp. 2057-2075 Titre : When does it pay to delay supplier qualification? : Theory and experiments Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Zhixi Wan, Auteur ; Damian R. Beil, Auteur ; Elena Katok, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 2057-2075 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Procurement  auctions  Supplier  qualification  Experiments Résumé : We study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening. Qualification screening is costly for the buyer, involving product tests, site visits, and interviews. In addition to a qualified incumbent supplier, the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification. The buyer wishes to run a price-only, open-descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant, and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction. We analytically study the buyer's optimal strategy, accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification, the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract. In our analysis, we derive the incumbent's optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high-cost incumbents hold back on bidding—or even boycott the auction—to preserve their profit margin, and only lower-cost incumbents bid to win. These results are strikingly different from the usual open-descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy. We test our analytical results in the laboratory, with human subjects. We find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well, although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts, making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/11/2057.abstract [article] When does it pay to delay supplier qualification? : Theory and experiments [texte imprimé] / Zhixi Wan, Auteur ; Damian R. Beil, Auteur ; Elena Katok, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 2057-2075. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) . - pp. 2057-2075 Mots-clés : Procurement  auctions  Supplier  qualification  Experiments Résumé : We study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening. Qualification screening is costly for the buyer, involving product tests, site visits, and interviews. In addition to a qualified incumbent supplier, the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification. The buyer wishes to run a price-only, open-descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant, and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction. We analytically study the buyer's optimal strategy, accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification, the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract. In our analysis, we derive the incumbent's optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high-cost incumbents hold back on bidding—or even boycott the auction—to preserve their profit margin, and only lower-cost incumbents bid to win. These results are strikingly different from the usual open-descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy. We test our analytical results in the laboratory, with human subjects. We find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well, although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts, making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/11/2057.abstract

Why genius leads to adversity / Elena Katok in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 6 (Juin 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 6 (Juin 2011) . - pp. 1042-1054 Titre : Why genius leads to adversity : Experimental evidence on the reputational effects of task difficulty choices Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Elena Katok, Auteur ; Enno Siemsen, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1042-1054 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Incentives  in  R&D  Behavioral  operations  Career  concerns  Decentralization Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We use a behavioral laboratory experiment to study how agents with reputation concerns select the difficulty of their tasks. Drawing upon existing theory, we subjected participants in our study to a context in which they had to convince a principal of their capability to reap financial benefits. Our results show that participants tended to increase the difficulty of their task to enhance their reputation. In addition, we provide evidence that performance rewards reduce a less capable agent's tendency to choose a more difficult task, whereas a highly capable agent's pattern of choices is unaffected by performance rewards. Although the productivity of agents in our experiment therefore decreased if they had to convince a principal of their capability, we show that these detrimental performance implications can to some degree be overcome for less capable agents through performance rewards or by ensuring that the principal can interpret the agent's choice. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/6.toc [article] Why genius leads to adversity : Experimental evidence on the reputational effects of task difficulty choices [texte imprimé] / Elena Katok, Auteur ; Enno Siemsen, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1042-1054. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 6 (Juin 2011) . - pp. 1042-1054 Mots-clés : Incentives  in  R&D  Behavioral  operations  Career  concerns  Decentralization Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We use a behavioral laboratory experiment to study how agents with reputation concerns select the difficulty of their tasks. Drawing upon existing theory, we subjected participants in our study to a context in which they had to convince a principal of their capability to reap financial benefits. Our results show that participants tended to increase the difficulty of their task to enhance their reputation. In addition, we provide evidence that performance rewards reduce a less capable agent's tendency to choose a more difficult task, whereas a highly capable agent's pattern of choices is unaffected by performance rewards. Although the productivity of agents in our experiment therefore decreased if they had to convince a principal of their capability, we show that these detrimental performance implications can to some degree be overcome for less capable agents through performance rewards or by ensuring that the principal can interpret the agent's choice. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/6.toc