Contracting in supply chains / Elena Katok in Management science, Vol. 55 N° 12 (Décembre 2009)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 55 N° 12 (Décembre 2009) . - pp. 1953-1968 Titre : Contracting in supply chains : a laboratory investigation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Elena Katok, Auteur ; Diana Yan Wu, Auteur Article en page(s) : pp. 1953-1968 Note générale : Gestion Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply chain contracts Experimental economics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem, the supplier has no capacity constraints, and delivery occurs instantaneously. We compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier. Results indicate that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract, the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts. We also find that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent, they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/12/1953?maxtoshow=&hit [...] [article] Contracting in supply chains : a laboratory investigation [texte imprimé] / Elena Katok, Auteur ; Diana Yan Wu, Auteur . - pp. 1953-1968. Gestion Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 55 N° 12 (Décembre 2009) . - pp. 1953-1968 Mots-clés : Supply chain contracts Experimental economics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem, the supplier has no capacity constraints, and delivery occurs instantaneously. We compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier. Results indicate that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract, the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts. We also find that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent, they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/12/1953?maxtoshow=&hit [...]

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