| Titre : | Three revenue-sharing variants : their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties (2013) |
| Auteurs : | Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; Z-S Hua, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Journal of the operational research society (JORS) (Vol. 63 N° 12, Décembre 2012) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 1752–1764 |
| Note générale : | operational research |
| Langues : | Anglais |
| Index. décimale : | 001.424 |
| Tags : | supply chain contract design ; revenue sharing ; decision making under uncertain system parameters ; stackelberg game structure |
| Résumé : | In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty. |
| DEWEY : | 001.424 |
| ISSN : | 0160-5682 |
| En ligne : | http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011131a.html |
