Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports / Nitin Bakshi in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 1 - 20 Titre : Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Nitin Bakshi, Auteur ; Stephen E. Flynn, Auteur ; Noah Gans, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1 - 20 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Homeland  security  Container  inspections  Queueing  simulation Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A.U.S. law mandating nonintrusive imaging and radiation detection for 100% of U.S.-bound containers at international ports has provoked widespread concern that the resulting congestion would hinder trade significantly. Using detailed data on container movements, gathered from two large international terminals, we simulate the impact of the two most important inspection policies that are being considered. We find that the current inspection regime being advanced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security can only handle a small percentage of the total load. An alternate inspection protocol that emphasizes screening—a rapid primary scan of all containers, followed by a more careful secondary scan of only a few containers that fail the primary test—holds promise as a feasible solution for meeting the 100% scanning requirement. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/1 [article] Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports [texte imprimé] / Nitin Bakshi, Auteur ; Stephen E. Flynn, Auteur ; Noah Gans, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1 - 20. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 1 - 20 Mots-clés : Homeland  security  Container  inspections  Queueing  simulation Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A.U.S. law mandating nonintrusive imaging and radiation detection for 100% of U.S.-bound containers at international ports has provoked widespread concern that the resulting congestion would hinder trade significantly. Using detailed data on container movements, gathered from two large international terminals, we simulate the impact of the two most important inspection policies that are being considered. We find that the current inspection regime being advanced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security can only handle a small percentage of the total load. An alternate inspection protocol that emphasizes screening—a rapid primary scan of all containers, followed by a more careful secondary scan of only a few containers that fail the primary test—holds promise as a feasible solution for meeting the 100% scanning requirement. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/1

Securing the containerized supply chain / Nitin Bakshi in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 2 (Fevrier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 2 (Fevrier 2010) . - pp. 219-233 Titre : Securing the containerized supply chain : Analysis of government incentives for private investment Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Nitin Bakshi, Auteur ; Noah Gans, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 219-233 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Game  theory  Nuclear  weapons  Container  inspections  Homeland  security  Queueing  theory  Terrorism  Principal-agent  models Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : To mitigate the threat that terrorists smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States through maritime containers, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspects containers upon entry to domestic ports. Inspection-driven congestion is costly, and CBP provides incentives to firms to improve security upstream in the supply chain, thereby reducing the inspection burden at U.S. ports. We perform an economic analysis of this incentive program, called Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), modeling in a game-theoretic framework the strategic interaction between CBP, trading firms, and terrorists. Our equilibrium results highlight the possibility that a properly run program can efficiently shift some of CBP's security burden to private industry. These results also suggest that CBP may have the opportunity to use strategic delay as an incentive for firms to join. Analysis of comparative statics shows that, with increasing capacity, membership in C-TPAT systematically declines. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/2.toc [article] Securing the containerized supply chain : Analysis of government incentives for private investment [texte imprimé] / Nitin Bakshi, Auteur ; Noah Gans, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 219-233. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 2 (Fevrier 2010) . - pp. 219-233 Mots-clés : Game  theory  Nuclear  weapons  Container  inspections  Homeland  security  Queueing  theory  Terrorism  Principal-agent  models Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : To mitigate the threat that terrorists smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States through maritime containers, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspects containers upon entry to domestic ports. Inspection-driven congestion is costly, and CBP provides incentives to firms to improve security upstream in the supply chain, thereby reducing the inspection burden at U.S. ports. We perform an economic analysis of this incentive program, called Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), modeling in a game-theoretic framework the strategic interaction between CBP, trading firms, and terrorists. Our equilibrium results highlight the possibility that a properly run program can efficiently shift some of CBP's security burden to private industry. These results also suggest that CBP may have the opportunity to use strategic delay as an incentive for firms to join. Analysis of comparative statics shows that, with increasing capacity, membership in C-TPAT systematically declines. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/2.toc