Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Carbon capture by fossil fuel power plants / Özge Islegen in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 21-39 Titre : Carbon capture by fossil fuel power plants : An economic analysis Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Özge Islegen, Auteur ; Stefan Reichelstein, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 21-39 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Cost–benefit  analysis  Environment  Pollution  Government  Energy  policies  Accounting  Natural  resources  Energy Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : For fossil fuel power plants to be built in the future, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies offer the potential for significant reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. We examine the break-even value for CCS adoptions, that is, the critical value in the charge for CO2 emissions that would justify investment in CCS capabilities. Our analysis takes explicitly into account that the supply of electricity at the wholesale level (generation) is organized competitively in some U.S. jurisdictions, whereas in others a regulated utility provides integrated generation and distribution services. For either market structure, we find that emissions charges near $30 per tonne of CO2 would be the break-even value for adopting CCS capabilities at new coal-fired power plants. The corresponding break-even values for natural gas plants are substantially higher, near $60 per tonne. Our break-even estimates serve as a basis for projecting the change in electricity prices once carbon emissions become costly. CCS capabilities effectively put an upper bound on the increase in electricity prices resulting from carbon regulations, and we estimate this bound to be near 30% at the retail level for both coal and natural gas plants. In contrast to the competitive power supply scenario, however, these price increases materialize only gradually for a regulated utility. The delay in price adjustments reflects that for regulated firms the basis for setting product prices is historical cost, rather than current cost. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/21 [article] Carbon capture by fossil fuel power plants : An economic analysis [texte imprimé] / Özge Islegen, Auteur ; Stefan Reichelstein, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 21-39. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 21-39 Mots-clés : Cost–benefit  analysis  Environment  Pollution  Government  Energy  policies  Accounting  Natural  resources  Energy Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : For fossil fuel power plants to be built in the future, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies offer the potential for significant reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. We examine the break-even value for CCS adoptions, that is, the critical value in the charge for CO2 emissions that would justify investment in CCS capabilities. Our analysis takes explicitly into account that the supply of electricity at the wholesale level (generation) is organized competitively in some U.S. jurisdictions, whereas in others a regulated utility provides integrated generation and distribution services. For either market structure, we find that emissions charges near $30 per tonne of CO2 would be the break-even value for adopting CCS capabilities at new coal-fired power plants. The corresponding break-even values for natural gas plants are substantially higher, near $60 per tonne. Our break-even estimates serve as a basis for projecting the change in electricity prices once carbon emissions become costly. CCS capabilities effectively put an upper bound on the increase in electricity prices resulting from carbon regulations, and we estimate this bound to be near 30% at the retail level for both coal and natural gas plants. In contrast to the competitive power supply scenario, however, these price increases materialize only gradually for a regulated utility. The delay in price adjustments reflects that for regulated firms the basis for setting product prices is historical cost, rather than current cost. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/21

Dynamics of rate-of-return regulation / Alexander Nezlobin in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 980-995 Titre : Dynamics of rate-of-return regulation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Alexander Nezlobin, Auteur ; Madhav V. Rajan, Auteur ; Stefan Reichelstein, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 980-995 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Accounting  Marginal  cost  Rate-of-return  regulation  Depreciation Résumé : Under rate-of-return regulation, a firm's product prices are constrained by the requirement that investors not earn more than an allowable return on the firm's assets. This paper examines the dynamic properties of the rate-of-return regulation process when the regulated firm periodically undertakes new capacity investments. Our analysis identifies prices that correspond to stationary values of the regulation process. It is shown that the underlying depreciation rules for property, plant, and equipment determine whether these stationary prices will be above, equal to, or below the long-run marginal cost of providing the regulated service. We provide conditions under which the rate-of-return regulation process is dynamically stable so that prices indeed converge to their stationary values. The overall efficiency of this regulation method is shown to depend on how well the applicable depreciation schedule matches the productivity pattern of the assets in use. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/980.abstract [article] Dynamics of rate-of-return regulation [texte imprimé] / Alexander Nezlobin, Auteur ; Madhav V. Rajan, Auteur ; Stefan Reichelstein, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 980-995. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 980-995 Mots-clés : Accounting  Marginal  cost  Rate-of-return  regulation  Depreciation Résumé : Under rate-of-return regulation, a firm's product prices are constrained by the requirement that investors not earn more than an allowable return on the firm's assets. This paper examines the dynamic properties of the rate-of-return regulation process when the regulated firm periodically undertakes new capacity investments. Our analysis identifies prices that correspond to stationary values of the regulation process. It is shown that the underlying depreciation rules for property, plant, and equipment determine whether these stationary prices will be above, equal to, or below the long-run marginal cost of providing the regulated service. We provide conditions under which the rate-of-return regulation process is dynamically stable so that prices indeed converge to their stationary values. The overall efficiency of this regulation method is shown to depend on how well the applicable depreciation schedule matches the productivity pattern of the assets in use. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/980.abstract