Information goods vs. industrial goods / Roy Jones in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 164-176 Titre : Information goods vs. industrial goods : Cost structure and competition Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Roy Jones, Auteur ; Haim Mendelson, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 164-176 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Information goods Convex development cost Product and price competition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects. We study how the structure of the firms' cost functions drives our results. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/164 [article] Information goods vs. industrial goods : Cost structure and competition [texte imprimé] / Roy Jones, Auteur ; Haim Mendelson, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 164-176. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 164-176 Mots-clés : Information goods Convex development cost Product and price competition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects. We study how the structure of the firms' cost functions drives our results. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/164

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