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Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? / Andrew M. Davis in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 177-192 Titre : Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Andrew M. Davis, Auteur ; Elena Katok, Auteur ; Anthony M. Kwasnica, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 177-192 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Reserve  prices  Procurement  auctions  Behavioral  operations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We investigate how auctioneers set reserve prices in auctions. A well-established theoretical result, assuming risk neutrality of the seller, is that the optimal reserve price should not depend on the number of participating bidders. In a set of controlled laboratory experiments, we find that seller behavior often deviates from the theoretical benchmarks. We extend the existing theory to explore three alternative explanations for our results: risk aversion, anticipated regret, and probability weighting. After fitting our data to each of these models through parameter estimation techniques on both an aggregate and individual level, we find that all three models are consistent with some of the characteristics of our data, but that the regret model provides a slightly more favorable fit overall. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/177 [article] Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? [texte imprimé] / Andrew M. Davis, Auteur ; Elena Katok, Auteur ; Anthony M. Kwasnica, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 177-192. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 1 (Janvier 2011) . - pp. 177-192 Mots-clés : Reserve  prices  Procurement  auctions  Behavioral  operations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We investigate how auctioneers set reserve prices in auctions. A well-established theoretical result, assuming risk neutrality of the seller, is that the optimal reserve price should not depend on the number of participating bidders. In a set of controlled laboratory experiments, we find that seller behavior often deviates from the theoretical benchmarks. We extend the existing theory to explore three alternative explanations for our results: risk aversion, anticipated regret, and probability weighting. After fitting our data to each of these models through parameter estimation techniques on both an aggregate and individual level, we find that all three models are consistent with some of the characteristics of our data, but that the regret model provides a slightly more favorable fit overall. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/1/177