Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Channel stuffing with short-term interest in market value / Guoming Lai in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 332-346 Titre : Channel stuffing with short-term interest in market value Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Guoming Lai, Auteur ; Laurens Debo, Auteur ; Lin Nan, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 332-346 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Channel  stuffing  Inventory  management  Market  value Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We study how a manager's short-term interest in the firm's market value may motivate channel stuffing: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows a manager to report sales in excess of demand in order to influence investors' valuation of the firm. We apply an inventory model that highlights the potential role of inventory in the manager's channel stuffing and the investors' valuation strategies. Sales in our model are constrained by available inventory. Our model yields a semiseparating and semipooling equilibrium contingent on the initial inventory level: When the demand is lower than a threshold that depends on and is below the initial inventory level, the manager pads sales by a part of the excess inventory and releases the inflated sales report. The investors "correct" the reported sales and are able to infer perfectly the firm's value. When the demand reaches or exceeds this threshold, the manager pads any excess inventory to the sales and reports the initial inventory is sold out, which censors large demand realizations. Then the investors only infer the real demand is no less than the threshold and value the firm accordingly by expectation. Channel stuffing can influence the inventory decision, too. We find both over- and underinvestment in the initial inventory can arise in our model. We discuss empirical and managerial implications of our findings. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/332 [article] Channel stuffing with short-term interest in market value [texte imprimé] / Guoming Lai, Auteur ; Laurens Debo, Auteur ; Lin Nan, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 332-346. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 332-346 Mots-clés : Channel  stuffing  Inventory  management  Market  value Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We study how a manager's short-term interest in the firm's market value may motivate channel stuffing: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows a manager to report sales in excess of demand in order to influence investors' valuation of the firm. We apply an inventory model that highlights the potential role of inventory in the manager's channel stuffing and the investors' valuation strategies. Sales in our model are constrained by available inventory. Our model yields a semiseparating and semipooling equilibrium contingent on the initial inventory level: When the demand is lower than a threshold that depends on and is below the initial inventory level, the manager pads sales by a part of the excess inventory and releases the inflated sales report. The investors "correct" the reported sales and are able to infer perfectly the firm's value. When the demand reaches or exceeds this threshold, the manager pads any excess inventory to the sales and reports the initial inventory is sold out, which censors large demand realizations. Then the investors only infer the real demand is no less than the threshold and value the firm accordingly by expectation. Channel stuffing can influence the inventory decision, too. We find both over- and underinvestment in the initial inventory can arise in our model. We discuss empirical and managerial implications of our findings. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/332

Supply chain performance under market valuation / Guoming Lai in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1933-1951 Titre : Supply chain performance under market valuation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Guoming Lai, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur ; Jun Yang, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1933-1951 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply  chain  Newsvendor  Capital  market  valuation Résumé : Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general, single buyback contract. We show that the buyer's stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium. Such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm's own performance, and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the supply chain. We further reveal scenarios where full supply chain efficiency cannot be reached under any single buyback contract. Then, focusing on contract design, we characterize conditions under which a menu of buyback contracts can prevent downstream stocking distortion and restore full efficiency in the supply chain. Our study demonstrates that in a supply chain context, a firm's incentive to undertake real economic activities to influence capital market valuation can potentially be resolved through operational means. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/10/1933.abstract [article] Supply chain performance under market valuation [texte imprimé] / Guoming Lai, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur ; Jun Yang, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1933-1951. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1933-1951 Mots-clés : Supply  chain  Newsvendor  Capital  market  valuation Résumé : Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general, single buyback contract. We show that the buyer's stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium. Such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm's own performance, and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the supply chain. We further reveal scenarios where full supply chain efficiency cannot be reached under any single buyback contract. Then, focusing on contract design, we characterize conditions under which a menu of buyback contracts can prevent downstream stocking distortion and restore full efficiency in the supply chain. Our study demonstrates that in a supply chain context, a firm's incentive to undertake real economic activities to influence capital market valuation can potentially be resolved through operational means. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/10/1933.abstract