[article]
Titre : |
Managing consumer returns in a competitive environment |
Type de document : |
texte imprimé |
Auteurs : |
Jeffrey D. Shulman, Auteur ; Anne T. Coughlan, Auteur ; R. Canan Savaskan, Auteur |
Année de publication : |
2011 |
Article en page(s) : |
pp. 347-362 |
Note générale : |
Management |
Langues : |
Anglais (eng) |
Mots-clés : |
Marketing Channels of distribution Competitive strategy Pricing |
Index. décimale : |
658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce |
Résumé : |
This paper investigates the pricing and restocking fee decisions of two competing firms selling horizontally differentiated products. We model a duopoly facing consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for the products and who must experience a product before knowing how well it matches with their preferences. The analysis yields several key insights. Restocking fees not only can be sustained in a competitive environment, but also are more severe when consumers are less informed about product fit and when consumers place a greater importance on how well products' attributes fit with their preferences. We compare the competitive equilibrium prices to a scenario in which consumers are certain about their preferences and find conditions defining when consumer uncertainty results in higher equilibrium prices. Comparison to a monopoly setting yields a surprising result: Equilibrium restocking fees in a competitive environment can be higher than those charged by a monopolist. |
DEWEY : |
658 |
ISSN : |
0025-1909 |
En ligne : |
http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/347 |
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 347-362
[article] Managing consumer returns in a competitive environment [texte imprimé] / Jeffrey D. Shulman, Auteur ; Anne T. Coughlan, Auteur ; R. Canan Savaskan, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 347-362. Management Langues : Anglais ( eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 347-362
Mots-clés : |
Marketing Channels of distribution Competitive strategy Pricing |
Index. décimale : |
658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce |
Résumé : |
This paper investigates the pricing and restocking fee decisions of two competing firms selling horizontally differentiated products. We model a duopoly facing consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for the products and who must experience a product before knowing how well it matches with their preferences. The analysis yields several key insights. Restocking fees not only can be sustained in a competitive environment, but also are more severe when consumers are less informed about product fit and when consumers place a greater importance on how well products' attributes fit with their preferences. We compare the competitive equilibrium prices to a scenario in which consumers are certain about their preferences and find conditions defining when consumer uncertainty results in higher equilibrium prices. Comparison to a monopoly setting yields a surprising result: Equilibrium restocking fees in a competitive environment can be higher than those charged by a monopolist. |
DEWEY : |
658 |
ISSN : |
0025-1909 |
En ligne : |
http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/347 |
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