Cooperation in games with forgetfulness / Raphael Thomadsen in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 363-375 Titre : Cooperation in games with forgetfulness Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Raphael Thomadsen, Auteur ; Pradeep Bhardwaj, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 363-375 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : marketing Competitive strategy Games–group decisions Information systems IT policy and management Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions. On one hand, forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators, making cooperation more difficult. On the other hand, under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments—even below-(stage) minimax punishments—credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate, facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall. We apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/363 [article] Cooperation in games with forgetfulness [texte imprimé] / Raphael Thomadsen, Auteur ; Pradeep Bhardwaj, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 363-375. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 363-375 Mots-clés : marketing Competitive strategy Games–group decisions Information systems IT policy and management Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions. On one hand, forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators, making cooperation more difficult. On the other hand, under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments—even below-(stage) minimax punishments—credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate, facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall. We apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/363

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