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Cooperation in games with forgetfulness / Raphael Thomadsen in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 363-375 Titre : Cooperation in games with forgetfulness Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Raphael Thomadsen, Auteur ; Pradeep Bhardwaj, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 363-375 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : marketing  Competitive  strategy  Games–group  decisions  Information  systems  IT  policy  and  management Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions. On one hand, forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators, making cooperation more difficult. On the other hand, under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments—even below-(stage) minimax punishments—credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate, facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall. We apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/363 [article] Cooperation in games with forgetfulness [texte imprimé] / Raphael Thomadsen, Auteur ; Pradeep Bhardwaj, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 363-375. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 2 (Février 2011) . - pp. 363-375 Mots-clés : marketing  Competitive  strategy  Games–group  decisions  Information  systems  IT  policy  and  management Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions. On one hand, forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators, making cooperation more difficult. On the other hand, under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments—even below-(stage) minimax punishments—credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate, facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall. We apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/2/363

Detailing vs. direct-to-consumer advertising in the prescription pharmaceutical industry / Ram Bala in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 148-160 Titre : Detailing vs. direct-to-consumer advertising in the prescription pharmaceutical industry Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Ram Bala, Auteur ; Pradeep Bhardwaj, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 148-160 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Pharmaceutical  marketing  Detailing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The pharmaceutical industry has always used sales representatives to target physicians (detailing), who are a key link in sales and market share for prescription pharmaceuticals. Since August of 1997, when the Food and Drug Administration eased the restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), there has been a dramatic increase in the use of DTCA by pharmaceutical firms to target end customers (patients). DTCA seems to have two different effects on pharmaceutical markets. The first is to inform patients about the availability of drugs for some ailments, thus expanding the market (constructive). The second is to persuade patients to talk about specific brands when they meet physicians, with the objective of influencing market share (combative). We consider both effects of DTCA in the presence of a detailing program in a competitive environment. We incorporate the dynamics of physician-patient interaction in a game-theoretic model where firms decide on the form of DTCA to adopt (constructive or combative) and then compete in the marketplace by choosing detailing and DTCA levels. We answer four questions: What is the impact of adopting DTCA on competitive intensity? How do optimal detailing levels for a firm change with the adoption of DTCA? How should the DTCA strategy for a firm vary depending on whether it is stronger or weaker in its degree of influence in the physician's office? Finally, under what conditions would competing firms voluntarily decide to pursue constructive DTCA? DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc [article] Detailing vs. direct-to-consumer advertising in the prescription pharmaceutical industry [texte imprimé] / Ram Bala, Auteur ; Pradeep Bhardwaj, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 148-160. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 148-160 Mots-clés : Pharmaceutical  marketing  Detailing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The pharmaceutical industry has always used sales representatives to target physicians (detailing), who are a key link in sales and market share for prescription pharmaceuticals. Since August of 1997, when the Food and Drug Administration eased the restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), there has been a dramatic increase in the use of DTCA by pharmaceutical firms to target end customers (patients). DTCA seems to have two different effects on pharmaceutical markets. The first is to inform patients about the availability of drugs for some ailments, thus expanding the market (constructive). The second is to persuade patients to talk about specific brands when they meet physicians, with the objective of influencing market share (combative). We consider both effects of DTCA in the presence of a detailing program in a competitive environment. We incorporate the dynamics of physician-patient interaction in a game-theoretic model where firms decide on the form of DTCA to adopt (constructive or combative) and then compete in the marketplace by choosing detailing and DTCA levels. We answer four questions: What is the impact of adopting DTCA on competitive intensity? How do optimal detailing levels for a firm change with the adoption of DTCA? How should the DTCA strategy for a firm vary depending on whether it is stronger or weaker in its degree of influence in the physician's office? Finally, under what conditions would competing firms voluntarily decide to pursue constructive DTCA? DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc