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Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies / Albert Y. Ha in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 3 (Mars 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 3 (Mars 2011) . - pp. 566-581 Titre : Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Albert Y. Ha, Auteur ; Shilu Tong, Auteur ; Hongtao Zhang, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 566-581 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply  chain  management  Supply  chain  competition  Information  sharing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies the incentive for vertical information sharing in competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale. We consider a model of two supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer selling to one retailer, with the retailers engaging in Cournot or Bertrand competition. For Cournot retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or at least one retailer's information is less accurate. A supply chain may become worse off when making its information more accurate or production diseconomy smaller, if such an improvement induces the firms in the rival supply chain to cease sharing information. For Bertrand retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or information is more accurate. Under Bertrand competition a manufacturer may be worse off by receiving information, which is never the case under Cournot competition. Information sharing in one supply chain triggers a competitive reaction from the other supply chain and this reaction is damaging to the first supply chain under Cournot competition but may be beneficial under Bertrand competition. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/3/566 [article] Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies [texte imprimé] / Albert Y. Ha, Auteur ; Shilu Tong, Auteur ; Hongtao Zhang, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 566-581. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 3 (Mars 2011) . - pp. 566-581 Mots-clés : Supply  chain  management  Supply  chain  competition  Information  sharing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies the incentive for vertical information sharing in competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale. We consider a model of two supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer selling to one retailer, with the retailers engaging in Cournot or Bertrand competition. For Cournot retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or at least one retailer's information is less accurate. A supply chain may become worse off when making its information more accurate or production diseconomy smaller, if such an improvement induces the firms in the rival supply chain to cease sharing information. For Bertrand retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or information is more accurate. Under Bertrand competition a manufacturer may be worse off by receiving information, which is never the case under Cournot competition. Information sharing in one supply chain triggers a competitive reaction from the other supply chain and this reaction is damaging to the first supply chain under Cournot competition but may be beneficial under Bertrand competition. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/3/566