Promised Delivery Time and Capacity Games in Time-Based Competition / Weixin Shang in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 3 (Mars 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 3 (Mars 2011) . - pp. 599-610 Titre : Promised Delivery Time and Capacity Games in Time-Based Competition Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Weixin Shang, Auteur ; Liming Liu, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 599-610 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Time-based competition Consumer choice model Nash equilibrium Switching surface Quality differentiation Capacity Marketing–operations interface Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We investigate firms' competitive behaviors in industries where customers are sensitive to both promised delivery time (PDT) and quality of service (QoS) measured by the on-time delivery rate. To study the competition in PDT at the marketing level, we construct an oligopoly game with an external QoS requirement. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium QoS exhibits a switching surface structure with respect to capacities. To study the competition in capacity at the strategic level, we construct a two-stage game in which the firms compete in terms of their capacities in stage 1 and in terms of PDT in stage 2. We show the existence of two different types of pure strategy equilibria and characterize them. This study provides the following insights: an index of time-based competitive advantage (ITCA) and the first-mover advantage determine the positions of the firms in time-based competition; either the well-known prisoner's dilemma or off-equilibrium behaviors due to different preferences for equilibria (when multiple equilibria exist) may lead the firms to overinvest in capacity, but no one may gain a competitive advantage; a uniform improvement in internal efficiency (i.e., a uniform capacity cost reduction) may harm everyone; quality differentiation (i.e., going beyond the QoS benchmark) plays a dual role in time-based competition, either helping a firm with a larger ITCA to compete more effectively, or helping a firm possibly with a smaller ITCA to preempt competitors and protect its market advantage. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/3/599 [article] Promised Delivery Time and Capacity Games in Time-Based Competition [texte imprimé] / Weixin Shang, Auteur ; Liming Liu, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 599-610. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 3 (Mars 2011) . - pp. 599-610 Mots-clés : Time-based competition Consumer choice model Nash equilibrium Switching surface Quality differentiation Capacity Marketing–operations interface Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We investigate firms' competitive behaviors in industries where customers are sensitive to both promised delivery time (PDT) and quality of service (QoS) measured by the on-time delivery rate. To study the competition in PDT at the marketing level, we construct an oligopoly game with an external QoS requirement. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium QoS exhibits a switching surface structure with respect to capacities. To study the competition in capacity at the strategic level, we construct a two-stage game in which the firms compete in terms of their capacities in stage 1 and in terms of PDT in stage 2. We show the existence of two different types of pure strategy equilibria and characterize them. This study provides the following insights: an index of time-based competitive advantage (ITCA) and the first-mover advantage determine the positions of the firms in time-based competition; either the well-known prisoner's dilemma or off-equilibrium behaviors due to different preferences for equilibria (when multiple equilibria exist) may lead the firms to overinvest in capacity, but no one may gain a competitive advantage; a uniform improvement in internal efficiency (i.e., a uniform capacity cost reduction) may harm everyone; quality differentiation (i.e., going beyond the QoS benchmark) plays a dual role in time-based competition, either helping a firm with a larger ITCA to compete more effectively, or helping a firm possibly with a smaller ITCA to preempt competitors and protect its market advantage. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/3/599

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