Sabotage in tournaments / Christine Harbring in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 611-627 Titre : Sabotage in tournaments : Evidence from a laboratory experiment Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Christine Harbring, Auteur ; Bernd Irlenbusch, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 611-627 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Decision analysis Applications Organizational studies making Motivation Incentives Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name "sabotage." Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/611 [article] Sabotage in tournaments : Evidence from a laboratory experiment [texte imprimé] / Christine Harbring, Auteur ; Bernd Irlenbusch, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 611-627. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 611-627 Mots-clés : Decision analysis Applications Organizational studies making Motivation Incentives Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name "sabotage." Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/611

Exemplaires

Code-barres	Cote	Support	Localisation	Section	Disponibilité
aucun exemplaire