Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets / Robert Swinney in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777 Titre : Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 763-777 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Capacity  Competition  Uncertainty  Investment  timing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763 [article] Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets [texte imprimé] / Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 763-777. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777 Mots-clés : Capacity  Competition  Uncertainty  Investment  timing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763

Selling to strategic consumers when product value is uncertain / Robert Swinney in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) . - pp. 1737-1751 Titre : Selling to strategic consumers when product value is uncertain : The value of matching supply and demand Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Robert Swinney, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1737-1751 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Strategic  consumer  behavior  Quick  response  Consumer  learning  Pricing  Demand  uncertainty Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We address the value of quick response production practices when selling to a forward-looking consumer population with uncertain, heterogeneous valuations for a product. Consumers have the option of purchasing the product early, before its value has been learned, or delaying the purchase decision until a time at which valuation uncertainty has been resolved. Whereas individual consumer valuations are uncertain ex ante, the market size is uncertain to the firm. The firm may either commit to a single production run at a low unit cost prior to learning demand, or commit to a quick response strategy that allows additional production after learning additional demand information. We find that the value of quick response is generally lower with strategic (forward-looking) customers than with nonstrategic (myopic) customers in this setting. Indeed, it is possible for a quick response strategy to decrease the profit of the firm, though whether this occurs depends on various characteristics of the market; specifically, we identify conditions under which quick response increases profit (when prices are increasing, when dissatisfied consumers can return the product at a cost to the firm) and conditions under which quick response may decrease profit (when prices are constant or when consumer returns are not allowed). DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/10/1737.abstract [article] Selling to strategic consumers when product value is uncertain : The value of matching supply and demand [texte imprimé] / Robert Swinney, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1737-1751. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) . - pp. 1737-1751 Mots-clés : Strategic  consumer  behavior  Quick  response  Consumer  learning  Pricing  Demand  uncertainty Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We address the value of quick response production practices when selling to a forward-looking consumer population with uncertain, heterogeneous valuations for a product. Consumers have the option of purchasing the product early, before its value has been learned, or delaying the purchase decision until a time at which valuation uncertainty has been resolved. Whereas individual consumer valuations are uncertain ex ante, the market size is uncertain to the firm. The firm may either commit to a single production run at a low unit cost prior to learning demand, or commit to a quick response strategy that allows additional production after learning additional demand information. We find that the value of quick response is generally lower with strategic (forward-looking) customers than with nonstrategic (myopic) customers in this setting. Indeed, it is possible for a quick response strategy to decrease the profit of the firm, though whether this occurs depends on various characteristics of the market; specifically, we identify conditions under which quick response increases profit (when prices are increasing, when dissatisfied consumers can return the product at a cost to the firm) and conditions under which quick response may decrease profit (when prices are constant or when consumer returns are not allowed). DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/10/1737.abstract

The value of fast fashion / Gérard P. Cachon in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 778-795 Titre : The value of fast fashion : Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Robert Swinney, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 778-795 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Strategic  consumer  behavior  Quick  response  Fast  fashion  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design "hot" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on "strategic" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/778 [article] The value of fast fashion : Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior [texte imprimé] / Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Robert Swinney, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 778-795. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 778-795 Mots-clés : Strategic  consumer  behavior  Quick  response  Fast  fashion  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design "hot" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on "strategic" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/778