Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets / Robert Swinney in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777 Titre : Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 763-777 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Capacity  Competition  Uncertainty  Investment  timing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763 [article] Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets [texte imprimé] / Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 763-777. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777 Mots-clés : Capacity  Competition  Uncertainty  Investment  timing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763

Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain / Gérard P. Cachon in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 571-589 Titre : Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain : On contractual form and coordination Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Gürhan A. Kök, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 571-589 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Contracting  Competition  Retailing  Wholesale-price  contract  Quantity  discount  Two-part  tariff Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc [article] Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain : On contractual form and coordination [texte imprimé] / Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Gürhan A. Kök, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 571-589. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 571-589 Mots-clés : Contracting  Competition  Retailing  Wholesale-price  contract  Quantity  discount  Two-part  tariff Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc

Drivers of finished-goods inventory in the U.S. automobile industry / Gérard P. Cachon in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 202-216 Titre : Drivers of finished-goods inventory in the U.S. automobile industry Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Marcelo Olivares, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 202-216 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Empirical  Supply  chain  management  Distribution  Product  variety  Inventory  theory  Manufacturing  flexibility Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Automobile manufacturers in the U.S. supply chain exhibit significant differences in their days of supply of finished vehicles (average inventory divided by average daily sales rate). For example, from 1995 to 2004, Toyota consistently carried approximately 30 fewer days of supply than General Motors. This suggests that Toyota's well-documented advantage in manufacturing efficiency, product design, and upstream supply chain management extends to their finished-goods inventory in their downstream supply chain from their assembly plants to their dealerships. Our objective in this research is to measure for this industry the effect of several factors on inventory holdings. We find that two factors, the number of dealerships in a manufacturer's distribution network and a manufacturer's production flexibility, explain essentially all of the difference in finished-goods inventory between Toyota and three other manufacturers: Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc [article] Drivers of finished-goods inventory in the U.S. automobile industry [texte imprimé] / Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Marcelo Olivares, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 202-216. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 202-216 Mots-clés : Empirical  Supply  chain  management  Distribution  Product  variety  Inventory  theory  Manufacturing  flexibility Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Automobile manufacturers in the U.S. supply chain exhibit significant differences in their days of supply of finished vehicles (average inventory divided by average daily sales rate). For example, from 1995 to 2004, Toyota consistently carried approximately 30 fewer days of supply than General Motors. This suggests that Toyota's well-documented advantage in manufacturing efficiency, product design, and upstream supply chain management extends to their finished-goods inventory in their downstream supply chain from their assembly plants to their dealerships. Our objective in this research is to measure for this industry the effect of several factors on inventory holdings. We find that two factors, the number of dealerships in a manufacturer's distribution network and a manufacturer's production flexibility, explain essentially all of the difference in finished-goods inventory between Toyota and three other manufacturers: Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc

The value of fast fashion / Gérard P. Cachon in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 778-795 Titre : The value of fast fashion : Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Robert Swinney, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 778-795 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Strategic  consumer  behavior  Quick  response  Fast  fashion  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design "hot" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on "strategic" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/778 [article] The value of fast fashion : Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior [texte imprimé] / Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Robert Swinney, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 778-795. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 778-795 Mots-clés : Strategic  consumer  behavior  Quick  response  Fast  fashion  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design "hot" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on "strategic" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/778