Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets / Robert Swinney in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777 Titre : Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 763-777 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Capacity  Competition  Uncertainty  Investment  timing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763 [article] Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms in new markets [texte imprimé] / Robert Swinney, Auteur ; Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 763-777. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 4 (Avril 2011) . - pp. 763-777 Mots-clés : Capacity  Competition  Uncertainty  Investment  timing  Game  theory Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/4/763

Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems / Sang-Hyun Kim in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1551-1567 Titre : Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Sang-Hyun Kim, Auteur ; Morris A. Cohen, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1551-1567 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Service  outsourcing  Supply  chain  After-sales  support  Maintenance–repairs  Disaster  recovery Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Firms that rely on functioning mission-critical equipment for their businesses cannot afford significant operational downtime due to system disruptions. To minimize the impact of disruptions, a proper incentive mechanism has to be in place so that the suppliers provide prompt restoration and recovery services to the customer. A widely adopted incentive mechanism is performance-based contracting (PBC), in which suppliers receive compensation based on realized system uptime. A key obstacle is that disruptions occur infrequently, making it very expensive for a supplier to commit the necessary resources for recovery because they will be idle most of the time. In this paper, we show that designing a successful PBC creates nontrivial challenges that are unique to this environment. Namely, because of the infrequent and random nature of disruptions, a seemingly innocuous choice of performance measures used in contracts may create unexpected incentives, resulting in counterintuitive optimal behavior. We compare the efficiencies of two widely used contracts, one based on sample-average downtime and the other based on cumulative downtime, and identify the supplier's ability to influence the frequency of disruptions as an important factor in determining which contract performs better. We also show that implementing PBC may create high agency cost when equipment is very reliable. This counterintuitive situation arises because the realized downtimes from which the customer might intuit about the supplier's capacity investment are highly uncertain when there are not many samples of downtimes, i.e., when disruptions occur rarely. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1551 [article] Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems [texte imprimé] / Sang-Hyun Kim, Auteur ; Morris A. Cohen, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1551-1567. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1551-1567 Mots-clés : Service  outsourcing  Supply  chain  After-sales  support  Maintenance–repairs  Disaster  recovery Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Firms that rely on functioning mission-critical equipment for their businesses cannot afford significant operational downtime due to system disruptions. To minimize the impact of disruptions, a proper incentive mechanism has to be in place so that the suppliers provide prompt restoration and recovery services to the customer. A widely adopted incentive mechanism is performance-based contracting (PBC), in which suppliers receive compensation based on realized system uptime. A key obstacle is that disruptions occur infrequently, making it very expensive for a supplier to commit the necessary resources for recovery because they will be idle most of the time. In this paper, we show that designing a successful PBC creates nontrivial challenges that are unique to this environment. Namely, because of the infrequent and random nature of disruptions, a seemingly innocuous choice of performance measures used in contracts may create unexpected incentives, resulting in counterintuitive optimal behavior. We compare the efficiencies of two widely used contracts, one based on sample-average downtime and the other based on cumulative downtime, and identify the supplier's ability to influence the frequency of disruptions as an important factor in determining which contract performs better. We also show that implementing PBC may create high agency cost when equipment is very reliable. This counterintuitive situation arises because the realized downtimes from which the customer might intuit about the supplier's capacity investment are highly uncertain when there are not many samples of downtimes, i.e., when disruptions occur rarely. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1551

Revenue management with strategic customers / Kinshuk Jerath in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 430-448 Titre : Revenue management with strategic customers : Last-minute selling and opaque selling Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Kinshuk Jerath, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur ; Senthil K. Veeraraghavan, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 430-448 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Distribution  channels  Competition  Revenue  management  Strategic  consumer  behavior  Rational  expectations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Companies in a variety of industries (e.g., airlines, hotels, theaters) often use last-minute sales to dispose of unsold capacity. Although this may generate incremental revenues in the short term, the long-term consequences of such a strategy are not immediately obvious: More discounted last-minute tickets may lead to more consumers anticipating the discount and delaying the purchase rather than buying at the regular (higher) prices, hence potentially reducing revenues for the company. To mitigate such behavior, many service providers have turned to opaque intermediaries, such as Hotwire.com, that hide many descriptive attributes of the service (e.g., departure times for airline tickets) so that the buyer cannot fully predict the ultimate service provider. Using a stylized economic model, this paper attempts to explain and compare the benefits of last-minute sales directly to consumers versus through an opaque intermediary. We utilize the notion of rational expectations to model consumer purchasing decisions: Consumers make early purchase decisions based on expectations regarding future availability, and these expectations are correct in equilibrium. We show that direct last-minute sales are preferred over selling through an opaque intermediary when consumer valuations for travel are high or there is little service differentiation between competing service providers, or both; otherwise, opaque selling dominates. Moreover, contrary to the usual belief that such sales are purely mechanisms for disposal of unused capacity, we show that opaque selling becomes more preferred over direct last-minute selling as the probability of having high demand increases. When firms randomize between opaque selling and last-minute selling strategies, they are increasingly likely to choose the opaque selling strategy as the probability of high demand increases. When firms with unequal capacities use the opaque selling strategy, consumers know more clearly where the opaque ticket is from and the efficacy of opaque selling decreases. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc [article] Revenue management with strategic customers : Last-minute selling and opaque selling [texte imprimé] / Kinshuk Jerath, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur ; Senthil K. Veeraraghavan, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 430-448. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 430-448 Mots-clés : Distribution  channels  Competition  Revenue  management  Strategic  consumer  behavior  Rational  expectations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Companies in a variety of industries (e.g., airlines, hotels, theaters) often use last-minute sales to dispose of unsold capacity. Although this may generate incremental revenues in the short term, the long-term consequences of such a strategy are not immediately obvious: More discounted last-minute tickets may lead to more consumers anticipating the discount and delaying the purchase rather than buying at the regular (higher) prices, hence potentially reducing revenues for the company. To mitigate such behavior, many service providers have turned to opaque intermediaries, such as Hotwire.com, that hide many descriptive attributes of the service (e.g., departure times for airline tickets) so that the buyer cannot fully predict the ultimate service provider. Using a stylized economic model, this paper attempts to explain and compare the benefits of last-minute sales directly to consumers versus through an opaque intermediary. We utilize the notion of rational expectations to model consumer purchasing decisions: Consumers make early purchase decisions based on expectations regarding future availability, and these expectations are correct in equilibrium. We show that direct last-minute sales are preferred over selling through an opaque intermediary when consumer valuations for travel are high or there is little service differentiation between competing service providers, or both; otherwise, opaque selling dominates. Moreover, contrary to the usual belief that such sales are purely mechanisms for disposal of unused capacity, we show that opaque selling becomes more preferred over direct last-minute selling as the probability of having high demand increases. When firms randomize between opaque selling and last-minute selling strategies, they are increasingly likely to choose the opaque selling strategy as the probability of high demand increases. When firms with unequal capacities use the opaque selling strategy, consumers know more clearly where the opaque ticket is from and the efficacy of opaque selling decreases. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc