Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

How does popularity information affect choices? / Catherine Tucker in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 5 (Mai 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 5 (Mai 2011) . - pp. 828-842 Titre : How does popularity information affect choices? : A field experiment Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Catherine Tucker, Auteur ; Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 828-842 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Popularity  information  Observational  learning  Field  experiment  Internet  marketing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Popularity information is usually thought to reinforce existing sales trends by encouraging customers to flock to mainstream products with broad appeal. We suggest a countervailing market force: popularity information may benefit niche products with narrow appeal disproportionately, because the same level of popularity implies higher quality for narrow-appeal products than for broad-appeal products. We examine this hypothesis empirically using field experiment data from a website that lists wedding service vendors. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis: narrow-appeal vendors receive more visits than equally popular broad-appeal vendors after the introduction of popularity information. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/5/828 [article] How does popularity information affect choices? : A field experiment [texte imprimé] / Catherine Tucker, Auteur ; Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 828-842. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 5 (Mai 2011) . - pp. 828-842 Mots-clés : Popularity  information  Observational  learning  Field  experiment  Internet  marketing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Popularity information is usually thought to reinforce existing sales trends by encouraging customers to flock to mainstream products with broad appeal. We suggest a countervailing market force: popularity information may benefit niche products with narrow appeal disproportionately, because the same level of popularity implies higher quality for narrow-appeal products than for broad-appeal products. We examine this hypothesis empirically using field experiment data from a website that lists wedding service vendors. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis: narrow-appeal vendors receive more visits than equally popular broad-appeal vendors after the introduction of popularity information. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/5/828

Rational herding in microloan markets / Juanjuan Zhang in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 892-912 Titre : Rational herding in microloan markets Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur ; Peng Liu, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 892-912 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Rational  herding  Observational  learning  Bayesian  inference  Microloan  markets  Peer-to-peer  lending  Prosper.com Résumé : Microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders. We use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on Prosper.com, the largest microloan market in the United States. We find evidence of rational herding among lenders. Well-funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities. Moreover, instead of passively mimicking their peers (irrational herding), lenders engage in active observational learning (rational herding); they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences. Counterintuitively, obvious defects (e.g., poor credit grades) amplify a listing's herding momentum, as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd. Similarly, favorable borrower characteristics (e.g., friend endorsements) weaken the herding effect, as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits. Follow-up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/892.abstract [article] Rational herding in microloan markets [texte imprimé] / Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur ; Peng Liu, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 892-912. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 892-912 Mots-clés : Rational  herding  Observational  learning  Bayesian  inference  Microloan  markets  Peer-to-peer  lending  Prosper.com Résumé : Microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders. We use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on Prosper.com, the largest microloan market in the United States. We find evidence of rational herding among lenders. Well-funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities. Moreover, instead of passively mimicking their peers (irrational herding), lenders engage in active observational learning (rational herding); they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences. Counterintuitively, obvious defects (e.g., poor credit grades) amplify a listing's herding momentum, as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd. Similarly, favorable borrower characteristics (e.g., friend endorsements) weaken the herding effect, as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits. Follow-up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/892.abstract

Why are bad products so hard to kill? / Duncan Simester in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 7 (Juillet 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 7 (Juillet 2010) . - pp. 1161-1179 Titre : Why are bad products so hard to kill? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Duncan Simester, Auteur ; Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1161-1179 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Product  development  Managerial  incentives  Moral  hazard  Adverse  selection  Information  acquisition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low. We argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers' incentives. Rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low. To avoid investing in low-demand products, the firm must also reward decisions to kill products. However, rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success. The inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low-demand products. We explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/7.toc [article] Why are bad products so hard to kill? [texte imprimé] / Duncan Simester, Auteur ; Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1161-1179. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 7 (Juillet 2010) . - pp. 1161-1179 Mots-clés : Product  development  Managerial  incentives  Moral  hazard  Adverse  selection  Information  acquisition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low. We argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers' incentives. Rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low. To avoid investing in low-demand products, the firm must also reward decisions to kill products. However, rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success. The inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low-demand products. We explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/7.toc