Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants / Hua Chen in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 5 (Mai 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 5 (Mai 2011) . - pp. 864-883 Titre : Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants : An experimental study Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Hua Chen, Auteur ; Sung H. Ham, Auteur ; Noah Lim, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 864-883 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Tournaments Compensation Sales management Experimental economics Behavioral Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Is the right amount of effort exerted in multiperson tournaments where contestants have two different levels of initial endowments (termed "favorites" and "underdogs")? We develop theoretical predictions for the level of effort and the effect of varying the prize structure. We test these predictions for three-person tournaments using an economic experiment in a social environment where contest outcomes are publicly announced. We find that both favorites and underdogs overexert effort relative to the theoretical point predictions. Moreover, in the treatment with two favorites and one underdog, favorites increase their effort when the number of prizes is increased from one to two, contrary to the theory prediction. We show that a generalized model that allows for psychological losses from losing for favorites and psychological gains from winning for underdogs because of social comparisons tracks the experimental results better than the standard theoretical model. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/5/864 [article] Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants : An experimental study [texte imprimé] / Hua Chen, Auteur ; Sung H. Ham, Auteur ; Noah Lim, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 864-883. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 5 (Mai 2011) . - pp. 864-883 Mots-clés : Tournaments Compensation Sales management Experimental economics Behavioral Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Is the right amount of effort exerted in multiperson tournaments where contestants have two different levels of initial endowments (termed "favorites" and "underdogs")? We develop theoretical predictions for the level of effort and the effect of varying the prize structure. We test these predictions for three-person tournaments using an economic experiment in a social environment where contest outcomes are publicly announced. We find that both favorites and underdogs overexert effort relative to the theoretical point predictions. Moreover, in the treatment with two favorites and one underdog, favorites increase their effort when the number of prizes is increased from one to two, contrary to the theory prediction. We show that a generalized model that allows for psychological losses from losing for favorites and psychological gains from winning for underdogs because of social comparisons tracks the experimental results better than the standard theoretical model. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/57/5/864

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