The firm as a socialization device / Abhijit Ramalingam in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 12 (Décembre 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 12 (Décembre 2010) . - pp. 2191-2206 Titre : The firm as a socialization device Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Abhijit Ramalingam, Auteur ; Michael T. Rauh, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 2191-2206 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Embeddedness Endogenous preferences Institutions Multitasking Norms Principal-agent theory Theory of the firm Trust Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Why do firms exist? What is their function? What do managers do? What is the role, if any, of social motivation in the market? In this paper, we address these questions with a new theory of the firm, which unites some major themes in management, principal-agent theory, and economic sociology. We show that although the market is a superior incentive mechanism, the firm has a comparative advantage with respect to social motivation. We then show that the market is efficient in environments that favor the provision of incentives, such as when subjective risk is low and performance is easy to measure. The firm is efficient in other environments where incentives are costly and/or ineffective. We compare our model and results with the views of Durkheim (Durkheim, E. 1984. The Division of Labor in Society. Free Press, New York) and Granovetter (Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociol. 91(3) 481–510). DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/12/2191 [article] The firm as a socialization device [texte imprimé] / Abhijit Ramalingam, Auteur ; Michael T. Rauh, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 2191-2206. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 12 (Décembre 2010) . - pp. 2191-2206 Mots-clés : Embeddedness Endogenous preferences Institutions Multitasking Norms Principal-agent theory Theory of the firm Trust Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Why do firms exist? What is their function? What do managers do? What is the role, if any, of social motivation in the market? In this paper, we address these questions with a new theory of the firm, which unites some major themes in management, principal-agent theory, and economic sociology. We show that although the market is a superior incentive mechanism, the firm has a comparative advantage with respect to social motivation. We then show that the market is efficient in environments that favor the provision of incentives, such as when subjective risk is low and performance is easy to measure. The firm is efficient in other environments where incentives are costly and/or ineffective. We compare our model and results with the views of Durkheim (Durkheim, E. 1984. The Division of Labor in Society. Free Press, New York) and Granovetter (Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociol. 91(3) 481–510). DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/12/2191

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