Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Component-based technology transfer in the presence of potential imitators / Jiong Sun in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 536-552 Titre : Component-based technology transfer in the presence of potential imitators Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Jiong Sun, Auteur ; Laurens G. Debo, Auteur ; Sunder Kekre, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 536-552 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Technology  transfer  Cost-saving  potential  Technology  imitation  Sourcing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Technology transfer to low-cost locations offers global firms an opportunity to reduce their variable costs involved in serving emerging markets. However, such moves may also make imitation by local competitors easier. As a consequence, technology transfer may create competition in the local market. We introduce component-based technology transfer for the global firm as a means to deter or accommodate the imitators' entry, recognizing that components may differ in technological complexity. By choosing a subset of components to transfer, the global firm's decision has an impact not only on the imitators' fixed entry costs, but also on postentry competition based on variable costs. Our research identifies two different types of deterrence strategies—the barrier-erecting strategy and the market-grabbing strategy. In the former deterrence strategy, the global firm retains enough component technology in the home country to make the potential imitator's fixed entry costs so high that it is not worthwhile entering. In the latter deterrence strategy, the global firm transfers enough component technology to the emerging market, reducing the global firm's variable cost to make the potential imitator's revenues so low that it is not worthwhile entering. Which deterrence strategy the global firm should employ depends on the degree to which geographical proximity reduces imitation costs and the degree of differentiation between the local firm's and the global firm's products. Some other interesting and counterintuitive results arise. For example, it may benefit a global firm to transfer less technology for products with a higher emerging market potential. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc [article] Component-based technology transfer in the presence of potential imitators [texte imprimé] / Jiong Sun, Auteur ; Laurens G. Debo, Auteur ; Sunder Kekre, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 536-552. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 536-552 Mots-clés : Technology  transfer  Cost-saving  potential  Technology  imitation  Sourcing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Technology transfer to low-cost locations offers global firms an opportunity to reduce their variable costs involved in serving emerging markets. However, such moves may also make imitation by local competitors easier. As a consequence, technology transfer may create competition in the local market. We introduce component-based technology transfer for the global firm as a means to deter or accommodate the imitators' entry, recognizing that components may differ in technological complexity. By choosing a subset of components to transfer, the global firm's decision has an impact not only on the imitators' fixed entry costs, but also on postentry competition based on variable costs. Our research identifies two different types of deterrence strategies—the barrier-erecting strategy and the market-grabbing strategy. In the former deterrence strategy, the global firm retains enough component technology in the home country to make the potential imitator's fixed entry costs so high that it is not worthwhile entering. In the latter deterrence strategy, the global firm transfers enough component technology to the emerging market, reducing the global firm's variable cost to make the potential imitator's revenues so low that it is not worthwhile entering. Which deterrence strategy the global firm should employ depends on the degree to which geographical proximity reduces imitation costs and the degree of differentiation between the local firm's and the global firm's products. Some other interesting and counterintuitive results arise. For example, it may benefit a global firm to transfer less technology for products with a higher emerging market potential. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc

Design and analysis of diagnostic service centers / Xiaofang Wang in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) . - pp. 1873-1890 Titre : Design and analysis of diagnostic service centers Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Xiaofang Wang, Auteur ; Laurens G. Debo, Auteur ; Alan Scheller-Wolf, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1873-1890 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Health-service  operations  Strategic  queueing  Diagnostic  process  Call  center Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : In the health-care domain, diagnostic service centers provide advice to patients over the phone about what the most appropriate course of action is based on their symptoms. Managers of such centers must strike a balance between accuracy of advice, callers' waiting time, and staffing costs by setting the appropriate capacity (staffing) and service depth. We model this problem as a multiple-server queueing system, with the servers performing a sequential testing process and the customers deciding whether or not to use the service, based on their expectation of accuracy and congestion. We find the dual concerns of accuracy and congestion lead to a counterintuitive impact of capacity: Increasing capacity might increase congestion. In addition, (i) patient population size is an important driver in management decisions, not only in staffing but also in accuracy of advice; (ii) increasing asymmetry in error costs may not increase asymmetry in the corresponding error rates; and (iii) the error costs for the two major stakeholders—the service manager and the patient—may impact the optimal staffing level in different ways. Finally, we highlight the relevance of our model and results to challenges in practice elicited during interviews with current clinical researchers and practitioners. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/11/1873 [article] Design and analysis of diagnostic service centers [texte imprimé] / Xiaofang Wang, Auteur ; Laurens G. Debo, Auteur ; Alan Scheller-Wolf, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1873-1890. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) . - pp. 1873-1890 Mots-clés : Health-service  operations  Strategic  queueing  Diagnostic  process  Call  center Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : In the health-care domain, diagnostic service centers provide advice to patients over the phone about what the most appropriate course of action is based on their symptoms. Managers of such centers must strike a balance between accuracy of advice, callers' waiting time, and staffing costs by setting the appropriate capacity (staffing) and service depth. We model this problem as a multiple-server queueing system, with the servers performing a sequential testing process and the customers deciding whether or not to use the service, based on their expectation of accuracy and congestion. We find the dual concerns of accuracy and congestion lead to a counterintuitive impact of capacity: Increasing capacity might increase congestion. In addition, (i) patient population size is an important driver in management decisions, not only in staffing but also in accuracy of advice; (ii) increasing asymmetry in error costs may not increase asymmetry in the corresponding error rates; and (iii) the error costs for the two major stakeholders—the service manager and the patient—may impact the optimal staffing level in different ways. Finally, we highlight the relevance of our model and results to challenges in practice elicited during interviews with current clinical researchers and practitioners. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/11/1873

Signaling quality via queues / Laurens G. Debo in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 876-891 Titre : Signaling quality via queues Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Laurens G. Debo, Auteur ; Christine Parlour, Auteur ; Uday Rajan, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 876-891 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Games–group  decisions  Stochastic  Probability  Stochastic  model  applications  Queues  Birth–death Résumé : We consider an M/M/1 queueing system with impatient consumers who observe the length of the queue before deciding whether to buy the product. The product may have high or low quality, and consumers are heterogeneously informed. The firm chooses a slow or (at a cost) a fast service rate. In equilibrium, informed consumers join the queue if it is below a threshold. The threshold varies with the quality of the good, so an uninformed consumer updates her belief about quality on observing the length of the queue. The strategy of an uninformed consumer has a “hole”: she joins the queue at lengths both below and above the hole, but not at the hole itself. We show that if the prior probability the product has high quality and the proportion of informed consumers are both low, a high-quality firm may select a slower service rate than a low-quality firm. The queue can therefore be a valuable signaling device for a high-quality firm. Strikingly, in some scenarios, the high-quality firm may choose the slow service rate even if the technological cost of speeding up is zero. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/876.abstract [article] Signaling quality via queues [texte imprimé] / Laurens G. Debo, Auteur ; Christine Parlour, Auteur ; Uday Rajan, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 876-891. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 876-891 Mots-clés : Games–group  decisions  Stochastic  Probability  Stochastic  model  applications  Queues  Birth–death Résumé : We consider an M/M/1 queueing system with impatient consumers who observe the length of the queue before deciding whether to buy the product. The product may have high or low quality, and consumers are heterogeneously informed. The firm chooses a slow or (at a cost) a fast service rate. In equilibrium, informed consumers join the queue if it is below a threshold. The threshold varies with the quality of the good, so an uninformed consumer updates her belief about quality on observing the length of the queue. The strategy of an uninformed consumer has a “hole”: she joins the queue at lengths both below and above the hole, but not at the hole itself. We show that if the prior probability the product has high quality and the proportion of informed consumers are both low, a high-quality firm may select a slower service rate than a low-quality firm. The queue can therefore be a valuable signaling device for a high-quality firm. Strikingly, in some scenarios, the high-quality firm may choose the slow service rate even if the technological cost of speeding up is zero. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/876.abstract