Optimal bundling strategies under heavy-tailed valuations / Rustam Ibragimov in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) . - pp. 1963-1976 Titre : Optimal bundling strategies under heavy-tailed valuations Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Rustam Ibragimov, Auteur ; Johan Walden, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1963-1976 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Optimal bundling strategies Multiproduct monopolist Vickrey auction Profit-maximizing prices Heavy-tailed valuations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We develop a framework for the optimal bundling problem of a multiproduct monopolist, who provides goods to consumers with private valuations that are random draws from a distribution with heavy tails. We show that in the Vickrey auction setting, the buyers prefer separate provision of the goods to any bundles. We also provide a complete characterization of the optimal bundling strategies for a monopolist producer, who provides goods for profit-maximizing prices. For products with low marginal costs, the seller's optimal strategy is to provide goods separately when consumers' valuations are heavy-tailed and in a single bundle when valuations are thin-tailed. These conclusions are reversed for goods with high marginal costs. For simplicity, we use a specific class of independent and identically distributed random variables, but our results can be generalized to include dependence, skewness, and the case of nonidentical one-dimensional distributions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/11/1963 [article] Optimal bundling strategies under heavy-tailed valuations [texte imprimé] / Rustam Ibragimov, Auteur ; Johan Walden, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1963-1976. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) . - pp. 1963-1976 Mots-clés : Optimal bundling strategies Multiproduct monopolist Vickrey auction Profit-maximizing prices Heavy-tailed valuations Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We develop a framework for the optimal bundling problem of a multiproduct monopolist, who provides goods to consumers with private valuations that are random draws from a distribution with heavy tails. We show that in the Vickrey auction setting, the buyers prefer separate provision of the goods to any bundles. We also provide a complete characterization of the optimal bundling strategies for a monopolist producer, who provides goods for profit-maximizing prices. For products with low marginal costs, the seller's optimal strategy is to provide goods separately when consumers' valuations are heavy-tailed and in a single bundle when valuations are thin-tailed. These conclusions are reversed for goods with high marginal costs. For simplicity, we use a specific class of independent and identically distributed random variables, but our results can be generalized to include dependence, skewness, and the case of nonidentical one-dimensional distributions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/11/1963

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