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Prediction markets / Paul J. Healy in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) . - pp. 1977-1996 Titre : Prediction markets : Alternative mechanisms for complex environments with few traders Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Paul J. Healy, Auteur ; Sera Linardi, Auteur ; J. Richard Lowery, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1977-1996 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Information  aggregation  Prediction  markets  Mechanism  design Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Double auction prediction markets have proven successful in large-scale applications such as elections and sporting events. Consequently, several large corporations have adopted these markets for smaller-scale internal applications where information may be complex and the number of traders is small. Using laboratory experiments, we test the performance of the double auction in complex environments with few traders and compare it to three alternative mechanisms. When information is complex we find that an iterated poll (or Delphi method) outperforms the double auction mechanism. We present five behavioral observations that may explain why the poll performs better in these settings. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/11/1977 [article] Prediction markets : Alternative mechanisms for complex environments with few traders [texte imprimé] / Paul J. Healy, Auteur ; Sera Linardi, Auteur ; J. Richard Lowery, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1977-1996. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 11 (Novembre 2010) . - pp. 1977-1996 Mots-clés : Information  aggregation  Prediction  markets  Mechanism  design Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Double auction prediction markets have proven successful in large-scale applications such as elections and sporting events. Consequently, several large corporations have adopted these markets for smaller-scale internal applications where information may be complex and the number of traders is small. Using laboratory experiments, we test the performance of the double auction in complex environments with few traders and compare it to three alternative mechanisms. When information is complex we find that an iterated poll (or Delphi method) outperforms the double auction mechanism. We present five behavioral observations that may explain why the poll performs better in these settings. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/11/1977