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An experimental test of advice and social learning / Bogaçhan Çelen in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) . - pp. 1687-1701 Titre : An experimental test of advice and social learning Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Bogaçhan Çelen, Auteur ; Shachar Kariv, Auteur ; Andrew Schotter, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1687-1701 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Experiment  Naïve  advice  Social  learning  Word-of-mouth  learning Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others but also from seeking advice. This paper introduces advice giving into the standard social-learning experiment of Çelen and Kariv (Çelen, B., S. Kariv. 2005. An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information. Econom. Theory 26(3) 677–699). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information—action and advice—are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects' welfare. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/10/1687 [article] An experimental test of advice and social learning [texte imprimé] / Bogaçhan Çelen, Auteur ; Shachar Kariv, Auteur ; Andrew Schotter, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1687-1701. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) . - pp. 1687-1701 Mots-clés : Experiment  Naïve  advice  Social  learning  Word-of-mouth  learning Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others but also from seeking advice. This paper introduces advice giving into the standard social-learning experiment of Çelen and Kariv (Çelen, B., S. Kariv. 2005. An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information. Econom. Theory 26(3) 677–699). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information—action and advice—are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects' welfare. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/10/1687

Social learning through endogenous information acquisition / Bogaçhan Çelen in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) . - pp.1525-1548 Titre : Social learning through endogenous information acquisition : An experiment Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Bogaçhan Çelen, Auteur ; Kyle Hyndman, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp.1525-1548 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Social  learning  Information  acquisition  Link  formation  Herd  behavior Résumé : This paper provides a test of a theory of social learning through endogenous information acquisition. A group of subjects face a decision problem under uncertainty. Subjects are endowed with private information about the fundamentals of the problem and make decisions sequentially. The key feature of the experiment is that subjects can observe the decisions of predecessors by forming links at a cost. The model predicts that the average welfare is enhanced in the presence of a small cost. Our experimental results support this prediction. When the informativeness of signals changes across treatments, behavior changes in accordance with the theory. However, within treatments, there are important deviations from rationality such as a tendency to conform and excessive link formation. Given these biases, our results indicate that subjects would, except when faced with a small cost, have been better off not forming any links. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/8/1525.short [article] Social learning through endogenous information acquisition : An experiment [texte imprimé] / Bogaçhan Çelen, Auteur ; Kyle Hyndman, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp.1525-1548. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) . - pp.1525-1548 Mots-clés : Social  learning  Information  acquisition  Link  formation  Herd  behavior Résumé : This paper provides a test of a theory of social learning through endogenous information acquisition. A group of subjects face a decision problem under uncertainty. Subjects are endowed with private information about the fundamentals of the problem and make decisions sequentially. The key feature of the experiment is that subjects can observe the decisions of predecessors by forming links at a cost. The model predicts that the average welfare is enhanced in the presence of a small cost. Our experimental results support this prediction. When the informativeness of signals changes across treatments, behavior changes in accordance with the theory. However, within treatments, there are important deviations from rationality such as a tendency to conform and excessive link formation. Given these biases, our results indicate that subjects would, except when faced with a small cost, have been better off not forming any links. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/8/1525.short