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Détail de l'auteur
Auteur Jagmohan S. Raju
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur
Affiner la rechercheCompetitive consequences of using a category captain / Upender Subramanian in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) . - pp. 1739-1765
Titre : Competitive consequences of using a category captain Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Upender Subramanian, Auteur ; Jagmohan S. Raju, Auteur ; Sanjay K. Dhar, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1739-1765 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Category management Delegation Distribution channels Retailing Suppy chain collaboration Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Many retailers designate one national brand manufacturer in each product category as a "category captain" to help manage the entire category. A category captain may perform demand-enhancing services such as better shelf arrangements, shelf-space management, and design and management of in-store displays. In this paper, we examine when and why a retailer may engage one manufacturer exclusively as a category captain to provide such service and the implications. We find that demand substitutability of competing brands gives rise to a service efficiency effect—service that expands the category is more effective in increasing a manufacturer's sales and margin than service that shifts demand from a rival's brand. We show that the service efficiency effect may motivate a category captain to provide a service that benefits all brands in the category even though doing so is more costly. We further show that, in categories that are less price competitive, there is higher competition between manufacturers to become the category captain. Consequently, a retailer may obtain better service by using a category captain than by engaging both manufacturers simultaneously. Our findings may help explain why a retailer may rely on a category captain despite concerns regarding opportunism and why there is limited empirical evidence of harm to rival manufacturers. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/10/1739 [article] Competitive consequences of using a category captain [texte imprimé] / Upender Subramanian, Auteur ; Jagmohan S. Raju, Auteur ; Sanjay K. Dhar, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1739-1765.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 10 (Octobre 2010) . - pp. 1739-1765
Mots-clés : Category management Delegation Distribution channels Retailing Suppy chain collaboration Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Many retailers designate one national brand manufacturer in each product category as a "category captain" to help manage the entire category. A category captain may perform demand-enhancing services such as better shelf arrangements, shelf-space management, and design and management of in-store displays. In this paper, we examine when and why a retailer may engage one manufacturer exclusively as a category captain to provide such service and the implications. We find that demand substitutability of competing brands gives rise to a service efficiency effect—service that expands the category is more effective in increasing a manufacturer's sales and margin than service that shifts demand from a rival's brand. We show that the service efficiency effect may motivate a category captain to provide a service that benefits all brands in the category even though doing so is more costly. We further show that, in categories that are less price competitive, there is higher competition between manufacturers to become the category captain. Consequently, a retailer may obtain better service by using a category captain than by engaging both manufacturers simultaneously. Our findings may help explain why a retailer may rely on a category captain despite concerns regarding opportunism and why there is limited empirical evidence of harm to rival manufacturers. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/10/1739 Positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market / S. Sajeesh in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) . - pp. 949-961
Titre : Positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : S. Sajeesh, Auteur ; Jagmohan S. Raju, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 949-961 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Variety seeking Positioning Pricing Differentiation Hotelling models Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety. Variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion. Using a three-stage Hotelling-type model, we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium, thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research. We find that firms charge higher prices in Period 1 and lower prices in Period 2. The lower price in Period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching. Furthermore, we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers. Finally, we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus. Surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers. Therefore, the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/6.toc [article] Positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market [texte imprimé] / S. Sajeesh, Auteur ; Jagmohan S. Raju, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 949-961.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) . - pp. 949-961
Mots-clés : Variety seeking Positioning Pricing Differentiation Hotelling models Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety. Variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion. Using a three-stage Hotelling-type model, we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium, thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research. We find that firms charge higher prices in Period 1 and lower prices in Period 2. The lower price in Period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching. Furthermore, we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers. Finally, we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus. Surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers. Therefore, the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/6.toc