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Détail de l'auteur
Auteur Evan Rawley
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur
Affiner la rechercheDiversification, diseconomies of scope, and vertical contracting / Evan Rawley in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1534-1550
Titre : Diversification, diseconomies of scope, and vertical contracting : Evidence from the taxicab industry Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Evan Rawley, Auteur ; Timothy S. Simcoe, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1534-1550 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Diversification Diseconomies of scope Adaptation Outsourcing Asset ownership Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies how firms reorganize following diversification, proposing that firms use outsourcing, or vertical disintegration, to manage diseconomies of scope. We also consider the origins of scope diseconomies, showing how different underlying mechanisms generate contrasting predictions about the link between within-firm task heterogeneity and the incentive to outsource following diversification. We test these propositions using microdata on taxicab and limousine fleets from the Economic Census. The results show that taxicab firms outsource, by shifting the composition of their fleets toward owner-operator drivers, when they diversify into the limousine business. The magnitude of the shift toward driver ownership is larger in less urban markets, where the tasks performed by taxicab and limousine drivers are more similar. These findings suggest that (1) firms use outsourcing to manage diseconomies of scope at a particular point in the value chain and (2) interagent conflicts can be an important source of scope diseconomies. [article] Diversification, diseconomies of scope, and vertical contracting : Evidence from the taxicab industry [texte imprimé] / Evan Rawley, Auteur ; Timothy S. Simcoe, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1534-1550.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1534-1550
Mots-clés : Diversification Diseconomies of scope Adaptation Outsourcing Asset ownership Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies how firms reorganize following diversification, proposing that firms use outsourcing, or vertical disintegration, to manage diseconomies of scope. We also consider the origins of scope diseconomies, showing how different underlying mechanisms generate contrasting predictions about the link between within-firm task heterogeneity and the incentive to outsource following diversification. We test these propositions using microdata on taxicab and limousine fleets from the Economic Census. The results show that taxicab firms outsource, by shifting the composition of their fleets toward owner-operator drivers, when they diversify into the limousine business. The magnitude of the shift toward driver ownership is larger in less urban markets, where the tasks performed by taxicab and limousine drivers are more similar. These findings suggest that (1) firms use outsourcing to manage diseconomies of scope at a particular point in the value chain and (2) interagent conflicts can be an important source of scope diseconomies. Skill, luck, and the multiproduct firm / Rui J. P. Jr de Figueiredo in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1963-1978
Titre : Skill, luck, and the multiproduct firm : Evidence from hedge funds Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Rui J. P. Jr de Figueiredo, Auteur ; Evan Rawley, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1963-1978 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Organizational studies Strategy Financial institutions Investment Economics Econometric dynamics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We formalize the idea that when managers require external investment to expand, higher-skilled firms will be more likely to diversify in equilibrium, even though managers can exploit asymmetric information about their ability to raise capital from investors. We exploit the timing of new fund launches in the hedge fund industry to distinguish between agency and capability effects in firm product diversification decisions, using a large survivor-bias-free panel data set on the hedge fund industry from 1994 to 2006. Empirically we show that diversifying firms' excess returns are high relative to those of other firms prior to diversification and fall within firm following diversification, but are six basis points higher per month per unit of risk ex post compared to a matched sample of focused firms. The evidence suggests that managers exploit asymmetric information about their own ability to time diversification decisions; yet, the discipline of markets ensures that better firms diversify, on average. The results provide large-sample empirical evidence that agency effects and firm capabilities jointly influence diversification decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1963.abstract [article] Skill, luck, and the multiproduct firm : Evidence from hedge funds [texte imprimé] / Rui J. P. Jr de Figueiredo, Auteur ; Evan Rawley, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1963-1978.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1963-1978
Mots-clés : Organizational studies Strategy Financial institutions Investment Economics Econometric dynamics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We formalize the idea that when managers require external investment to expand, higher-skilled firms will be more likely to diversify in equilibrium, even though managers can exploit asymmetric information about their ability to raise capital from investors. We exploit the timing of new fund launches in the hedge fund industry to distinguish between agency and capability effects in firm product diversification decisions, using a large survivor-bias-free panel data set on the hedge fund industry from 1994 to 2006. Empirically we show that diversifying firms' excess returns are high relative to those of other firms prior to diversification and fall within firm following diversification, but are six basis points higher per month per unit of risk ex post compared to a matched sample of focused firms. The evidence suggests that managers exploit asymmetric information about their own ability to time diversification decisions; yet, the discipline of markets ensures that better firms diversify, on average. The results provide large-sample empirical evidence that agency effects and firm capabilities jointly influence diversification decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1963.abstract