Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems / Sang-Hyun Kim in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1551-1567 Titre : Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Sang-Hyun Kim, Auteur ; Morris A. Cohen, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1551-1567 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Service  outsourcing  Supply  chain  After-sales  support  Maintenance–repairs  Disaster  recovery Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Firms that rely on functioning mission-critical equipment for their businesses cannot afford significant operational downtime due to system disruptions. To minimize the impact of disruptions, a proper incentive mechanism has to be in place so that the suppliers provide prompt restoration and recovery services to the customer. A widely adopted incentive mechanism is performance-based contracting (PBC), in which suppliers receive compensation based on realized system uptime. A key obstacle is that disruptions occur infrequently, making it very expensive for a supplier to commit the necessary resources for recovery because they will be idle most of the time. In this paper, we show that designing a successful PBC creates nontrivial challenges that are unique to this environment. Namely, because of the infrequent and random nature of disruptions, a seemingly innocuous choice of performance measures used in contracts may create unexpected incentives, resulting in counterintuitive optimal behavior. We compare the efficiencies of two widely used contracts, one based on sample-average downtime and the other based on cumulative downtime, and identify the supplier's ability to influence the frequency of disruptions as an important factor in determining which contract performs better. We also show that implementing PBC may create high agency cost when equipment is very reliable. This counterintuitive situation arises because the realized downtimes from which the customer might intuit about the supplier's capacity investment are highly uncertain when there are not many samples of downtimes, i.e., when disruptions occur rarely. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1551 [article] Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems [texte imprimé] / Sang-Hyun Kim, Auteur ; Morris A. Cohen, Auteur ; Serguei Netessine, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1551-1567. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1551-1567 Mots-clés : Service  outsourcing  Supply  chain  After-sales  support  Maintenance–repairs  Disaster  recovery Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Firms that rely on functioning mission-critical equipment for their businesses cannot afford significant operational downtime due to system disruptions. To minimize the impact of disruptions, a proper incentive mechanism has to be in place so that the suppliers provide prompt restoration and recovery services to the customer. A widely adopted incentive mechanism is performance-based contracting (PBC), in which suppliers receive compensation based on realized system uptime. A key obstacle is that disruptions occur infrequently, making it very expensive for a supplier to commit the necessary resources for recovery because they will be idle most of the time. In this paper, we show that designing a successful PBC creates nontrivial challenges that are unique to this environment. Namely, because of the infrequent and random nature of disruptions, a seemingly innocuous choice of performance measures used in contracts may create unexpected incentives, resulting in counterintuitive optimal behavior. We compare the efficiencies of two widely used contracts, one based on sample-average downtime and the other based on cumulative downtime, and identify the supplier's ability to influence the frequency of disruptions as an important factor in determining which contract performs better. We also show that implementing PBC may create high agency cost when equipment is very reliable. This counterintuitive situation arises because the realized downtimes from which the customer might intuit about the supplier's capacity investment are highly uncertain when there are not many samples of downtimes, i.e., when disruptions occur rarely. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1551

Impact of performance-based contracting on product reliability / Jose A. Guajardo in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 961-979 Titre : Impact of performance-based contracting on product reliability : An empirical analysis Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Jose A. Guajardo, Auteur ; Morris A. Cohen, Auteur ; Sang-Hyun Kim, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 961-979 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Reliability  Maintenance  repairs  Empirical  operations  management  Supply  chain  contracting  Aerospace  industry Résumé : Using a proprietary data set provided by a major manufacturer of aircraft engines, we empirically investigate how product reliability is impacted by the use of two different types of after-sales maintenance support contracts: time and material contracts (T&MC) and performance-based contracts (PBC). We offer a number of competing arguments based on the theory of incentives that establish why product reliability may increase or decrease under PBC. We build a two-stage econometric model that explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of contract choices, and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of PBC on product reliability. The estimation of our model indicates that product reliability is higher by 25%–40% under PBC compared to under T&MC, once the endogeneity of contract choice is taken into account. Our results are consistent with two mechanisms for reliability improvement under PBC: more frequent scheduled maintenance and better care performed in each maintenance event. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/961.abstract [article] Impact of performance-based contracting on product reliability : An empirical analysis [texte imprimé] / Jose A. Guajardo, Auteur ; Morris A. Cohen, Auteur ; Sang-Hyun Kim, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 961-979. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 961-979 Mots-clés : Reliability  Maintenance  repairs  Empirical  operations  management  Supply  chain  contracting  Aerospace  industry Résumé : Using a proprietary data set provided by a major manufacturer of aircraft engines, we empirically investigate how product reliability is impacted by the use of two different types of after-sales maintenance support contracts: time and material contracts (T&MC) and performance-based contracts (PBC). We offer a number of competing arguments based on the theory of incentives that establish why product reliability may increase or decrease under PBC. We build a two-stage econometric model that explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of contract choices, and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of PBC on product reliability. The estimation of our model indicates that product reliability is higher by 25%–40% under PBC compared to under T&MC, once the endogeneity of contract choice is taken into account. Our results are consistent with two mechanisms for reliability improvement under PBC: more frequent scheduled maintenance and better care performed in each maintenance event. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/961.abstract