Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? / Terry A. Taylor in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1584-1598 Titre : Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Terry A. Taylor, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1584-1598 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply chain contracting Asymmetric information Forecasting Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1584 [article] Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? [texte imprimé] / Terry A. Taylor, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1584-1598. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1584-1598 Mots-clés : Supply chain contracting Asymmetric information Forecasting Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1584

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