Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? / Terry A. Taylor in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1584-1598 Titre : Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Terry A. Taylor, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1584-1598 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply  chain  contracting  Asymmetric  information  Forecasting Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1584 [article] Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? [texte imprimé] / Terry A. Taylor, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1584-1598. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 9 (Septembre 2010) . - pp. 1584-1598 Mots-clés : Supply  chain  contracting  Asymmetric  information  Forecasting Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/9/1584

Supply chain performance under market valuation / Guoming Lai in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1933-1951 Titre : Supply chain performance under market valuation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Guoming Lai, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur ; Jun Yang, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1933-1951 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply  chain  Newsvendor  Capital  market  valuation Résumé : Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general, single buyback contract. We show that the buyer's stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium. Such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm's own performance, and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the supply chain. We further reveal scenarios where full supply chain efficiency cannot be reached under any single buyback contract. Then, focusing on contract design, we characterize conditions under which a menu of buyback contracts can prevent downstream stocking distortion and restore full efficiency in the supply chain. Our study demonstrates that in a supply chain context, a firm's incentive to undertake real economic activities to influence capital market valuation can potentially be resolved through operational means. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/10/1933.abstract [article] Supply chain performance under market valuation [texte imprimé] / Guoming Lai, Auteur ; Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur ; Jun Yang, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1933-1951. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1933-1951 Mots-clés : Supply  chain  Newsvendor  Capital  market  valuation Résumé : Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general, single buyback contract. We show that the buyer's stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium. Such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm's own performance, and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the supply chain. We further reveal scenarios where full supply chain efficiency cannot be reached under any single buyback contract. Then, focusing on contract design, we characterize conditions under which a menu of buyback contracts can prevent downstream stocking distortion and restore full efficiency in the supply chain. Our study demonstrates that in a supply chain context, a firm's incentive to undertake real economic activities to influence capital market valuation can potentially be resolved through operational means. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/10/1933.abstract

The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance / Wenqiang Xiao in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 2251-2271 Titre : The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur ; Yi Xu, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 2251-2271 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Research  and  development  Royalty  contract  Renegotiation  Incentives  R&D  alliance Résumé : This paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a two-stage (research and development (R&D) stage and marketing stage) alliance with a marketer and an innovator. The marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator. We find that the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer. We show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage, the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later. Otherwise, she should do the opposite. We identify two major effects of royalty revision. First, royalty revision provides the marketer with a flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates across the two stages of the alliance to better align the innovator's incentives. This incentive-realigning effect improves the marketer's profit. Second, royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator, because the innovator worries that the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable one to herself later. This information-revealing effect hurts the marketer's profit. We characterize in what kind of alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision so that managers should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision, and in what kind of alliances markerters would not benefit from royalty revision so that managers should commit not to revise the initial royalty contract. With royalty contracts that are contingent on the R&D outcome of the R&D stage, we find that contingent contract structure could be either substitutable (by fully capturing the incentive re-aligning effect) or complementary (by weakening the information revealing effect) to royalty revision, depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage. Managers may need to use a contingent contract (if possible) either to replace or with royalty revision accordingly to improve profits. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/12/2251.abstract [article] The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance [texte imprimé] / Wenqiang Xiao, Auteur ; Yi Xu, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 2251-2271. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 2251-2271 Mots-clés : Research  and  development  Royalty  contract  Renegotiation  Incentives  R&D  alliance Résumé : This paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a two-stage (research and development (R&D) stage and marketing stage) alliance with a marketer and an innovator. The marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator. We find that the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer. We show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage, the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later. Otherwise, she should do the opposite. We identify two major effects of royalty revision. First, royalty revision provides the marketer with a flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates across the two stages of the alliance to better align the innovator's incentives. This incentive-realigning effect improves the marketer's profit. Second, royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator, because the innovator worries that the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable one to herself later. This information-revealing effect hurts the marketer's profit. We characterize in what kind of alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision so that managers should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision, and in what kind of alliances markerters would not benefit from royalty revision so that managers should commit not to revise the initial royalty contract. With royalty contracts that are contingent on the R&D outcome of the R&D stage, we find that contingent contract structure could be either substitutable (by fully capturing the incentive re-aligning effect) or complementary (by weakening the information revealing effect) to royalty revision, depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage. Managers may need to use a contingent contract (if possible) either to replace or with royalty revision accordingly to improve profits. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/12/2251.abstract