Strategic investment with debt financing / Michi Nishihara in International journal of management science and engineering management, Vol. 5 N° 1 (Fevrier 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inInternational journal of management science and engineering management > Vol. 5 N° 1 (Fevrier 2010) . - pp.3-14 Titre : Strategic investment with debt financing Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Michi Nishihara, Auteur ; Takashi Shibata, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp.3-14 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Strategic real options Investment game Debt financing Capital structure Résumé : This paper investigates firm values and investment strategies (investment, coupon, and default timing) when several firms make strategic real investments with debt financing. We derive and compare the equilibrium investment strategies in three types of duopoly: (i) two symmetric firms, both of which can issue debt, (ii) two symmetric firms, only one of which (the leader) can issue debt, and (iii) a levered firm versus an unlevered firm. We show that in (iii) and in equilibrium, the levered firm always invests prior to the unlevered firm. Further, we derive the equilibrium in the competitive situation of n levered firms, and show that social loss increases as the number of the firms, n, becomes larger. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 1750-9653 En ligne : http://www.ijmsem.org/OnlineJournal.do/?109.html [article] Strategic investment with debt financing [texte imprimé] / Michi Nishihara, Auteur ; Takashi Shibata, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp.3-14. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in International journal of management science and engineering management > Vol. 5 N° 1 (Fevrier 2010) . - pp.3-14 Mots-clés : Strategic real options Investment game Debt financing Capital structure Résumé : This paper investigates firm values and investment strategies (investment, coupon, and default timing) when several firms make strategic real investments with debt financing. We derive and compare the equilibrium investment strategies in three types of duopoly: (i) two symmetric firms, both of which can issue debt, (ii) two symmetric firms, only one of which (the leader) can issue debt, and (iii) a levered firm versus an unlevered firm. We show that in (iii) and in equilibrium, the levered firm always invests prior to the unlevered firm. Further, we derive the equilibrium in the competitive situation of n levered firms, and show that social loss increases as the number of the firms, n, becomes larger. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 1750-9653 En ligne : http://www.ijmsem.org/OnlineJournal.do/?109.html

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