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Ultimate ownership and firm performance / Kun Su in International journal of management science and engineering management, Vol. 5 N° 3 (Juin 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in International journal of management science and engineering management > Vol. 5 N° 3 (Juin 2010) . - pp.182-191 Titre : Ultimate ownership and firm performance : evidence from chinese private listed firms Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Kun Su, Auteur ; Shu'e Yang, Auteur ; Bei Yang, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp.182-191 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Ultimat  control  Free  cash  flow  Firm  performance  P-P  conflict Résumé : Compared with the traditional principal-agent conflicts which are investigated heavily in previous studies in developed countries, principal-principal conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are much more important in emerging countries. From the perspective of ultimate ownership structure, by tracing the identity of large shareholders, we find that most of Chinese private listed firms have a ultimate controlling shareholder. This study investigates both the impact of cash flow right and the divergence between the control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholder on firm performance, and the constraint effect of free cash flows on ultimate controlling shareholders' entrenchment behaviors. We find that the cash flow right and firm performance are significantly positively related, and there is an "incentive effect" for ultimate controlling shareholders; the ivergence between the control right and cash flow right is significantly negatively associated with firm performance, and ultimate controlling shareholders have an "entrenchment effect" on firms; Further, we find that ultimate controlling shareholders' entrenchment behavior occurs only when they have the "ability" and "motivation", and the "opportunity" of having sufficient free cash flows. Therefore, lower free cash flows can efficiently constrain such entrenchment behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholders. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 1750-9653 En ligne : http://www.ijmsem.org/OnlineJournal.do/?132.html [article] Ultimate ownership and firm performance : evidence from chinese private listed firms [texte imprimé] / Kun Su, Auteur ; Shu'e Yang, Auteur ; Bei Yang, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp.182-191. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in International journal of management science and engineering management > Vol. 5 N° 3 (Juin 2010) . - pp.182-191 Mots-clés : Ultimat  control  Free  cash  flow  Firm  performance  P-P  conflict Résumé : Compared with the traditional principal-agent conflicts which are investigated heavily in previous studies in developed countries, principal-principal conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are much more important in emerging countries. From the perspective of ultimate ownership structure, by tracing the identity of large shareholders, we find that most of Chinese private listed firms have a ultimate controlling shareholder. This study investigates both the impact of cash flow right and the divergence between the control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholder on firm performance, and the constraint effect of free cash flows on ultimate controlling shareholders' entrenchment behaviors. We find that the cash flow right and firm performance are significantly positively related, and there is an "incentive effect" for ultimate controlling shareholders; the ivergence between the control right and cash flow right is significantly negatively associated with firm performance, and ultimate controlling shareholders have an "entrenchment effect" on firms; Further, we find that ultimate controlling shareholders' entrenchment behavior occurs only when they have the "ability" and "motivation", and the "opportunity" of having sufficient free cash flows. Therefore, lower free cash flows can efficiently constrain such entrenchment behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholders. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 1750-9653 En ligne : http://www.ijmsem.org/OnlineJournal.do/?132.html