Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Goodbye pareto principle, hello long tail / Erik Brynjolfsson in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 8 (Août 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 8 (Août 2011) . - pp. 1373-1386 Titre : Goodbye pareto principle, hello long tail : The effect of search costs on the concentration of product sales Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Erik Brynjolfsson, Auteur ; Yu (Jeffrey) Hu, Auteur ; Duncan Simester, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1373-1386 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Long  tail  Search  cost  Product  variety  Concentration  Product  sales  Internet  Electronic  commerce Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Many markets have historically been dominated by a small number of best-selling products. The Pareto principle, also known as the 80/20 rule, describes this common pattern of sales concentration. However, information technology in general and Internet markets in particular have the potential to substantially increase the collective share of niche products, thereby creating a longer tail in the distribution of sales. This paper investigates the Internet's “long tail” phenomenon. By analyzing data collected from a multichannel retailer, it provides empirical evidence that the Internet channel exhibits a significantly less concentrated sales distribution when compared with traditional channels. Previous explanations for this result have focused on differences in product availability between channels. However, we demonstrate that the result survives even when the Internet and traditional channels share exactly the same product availability and prices. Instead, we find that consumers' usage of Internet search and discovery tools, such as recommendation engines, are associated with an increase the share of niche products. We conclude that the Internet's long tail is not solely due to the increase in product selection but may also partly reflect lower search costs on the Internet. If the relationships we uncover persist, the underlying trends in technology portend an ongoing shift in the distribution of product sales. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/8.toc [article] Goodbye pareto principle, hello long tail : The effect of search costs on the concentration of product sales [texte imprimé] / Erik Brynjolfsson, Auteur ; Yu (Jeffrey) Hu, Auteur ; Duncan Simester, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1373-1386. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 8 (Août 2011) . - pp. 1373-1386 Mots-clés : Long  tail  Search  cost  Product  variety  Concentration  Product  sales  Internet  Electronic  commerce Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Many markets have historically been dominated by a small number of best-selling products. The Pareto principle, also known as the 80/20 rule, describes this common pattern of sales concentration. However, information technology in general and Internet markets in particular have the potential to substantially increase the collective share of niche products, thereby creating a longer tail in the distribution of sales. This paper investigates the Internet's “long tail” phenomenon. By analyzing data collected from a multichannel retailer, it provides empirical evidence that the Internet channel exhibits a significantly less concentrated sales distribution when compared with traditional channels. Previous explanations for this result have focused on differences in product availability between channels. However, we demonstrate that the result survives even when the Internet and traditional channels share exactly the same product availability and prices. Instead, we find that consumers' usage of Internet search and discovery tools, such as recommendation engines, are associated with an increase the share of niche products. We conclude that the Internet's long tail is not solely due to the increase in product selection but may also partly reflect lower search costs on the Internet. If the relationships we uncover persist, the underlying trends in technology portend an ongoing shift in the distribution of product sales. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/8.toc

Why are bad products so hard to kill? / Duncan Simester in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 7 (Juillet 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 7 (Juillet 2010) . - pp. 1161-1179 Titre : Why are bad products so hard to kill? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Duncan Simester, Auteur ; Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1161-1179 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Product  development  Managerial  incentives  Moral  hazard  Adverse  selection  Information  acquisition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low. We argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers' incentives. Rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low. To avoid investing in low-demand products, the firm must also reward decisions to kill products. However, rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success. The inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low-demand products. We explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/7.toc [article] Why are bad products so hard to kill? [texte imprimé] / Duncan Simester, Auteur ; Juanjuan Zhang, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1161-1179. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 7 (Juillet 2010) . - pp. 1161-1179 Mots-clés : Product  development  Managerial  incentives  Moral  hazard  Adverse  selection  Information  acquisition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low. We argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers' incentives. Rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low. To avoid investing in low-demand products, the firm must also reward decisions to kill products. However, rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success. The inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low-demand products. We explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/7.toc