Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Discretionary disclosure of proprietary information in a multisegment firm / Anil Arya in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 4 (Avril 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 4 (Avril 2010) . - pp. 645-658 Titre : Discretionary disclosure of proprietary information in a multisegment firm Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Anil Arya, Auteur ; Hans Frimor, Auteur ; Brian Mittendorf, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 645-658 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Aggregation  Competition  Disclosure Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The seminal “unraveling” result in the disclosure literature posits that discretion inevitably leads to full disclosure, even when such disclosure has detrimental consequences. In this paper, we revisit optimal disclosure of proprietary information when firms compete in multiple markets. The analysis demonstrates that in the presence of multiple segments, the unraveling result applies at the firmwide level but not necessarily segment by segment. Instead, when the firm has an ex ante desire to withhold information and segments are sufficiently similar, the ex post disclosure equilibrium entails aggregation of segment details. Aggregation arises because any ex post temptation to disaggregate and reveal particularly favorable news in one segment entails revealing unfavorable news in another segment. A desire to balance profits across segments then leads a firm to disclose firmwide information (a temptation that cannot be avoided), but only in the aggregate. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/4.toc [article] Discretionary disclosure of proprietary information in a multisegment firm [texte imprimé] / Anil Arya, Auteur ; Hans Frimor, Auteur ; Brian Mittendorf, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 645-658. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 4 (Avril 2010) . - pp. 645-658 Mots-clés : Aggregation  Competition  Disclosure Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The seminal “unraveling” result in the disclosure literature posits that discretion inevitably leads to full disclosure, even when such disclosure has detrimental consequences. In this paper, we revisit optimal disclosure of proprietary information when firms compete in multiple markets. The analysis demonstrates that in the presence of multiple segments, the unraveling result applies at the firmwide level but not necessarily segment by segment. Instead, when the firm has an ex ante desire to withhold information and segments are sufficiently similar, the ex post disclosure equilibrium entails aggregation of segment details. Aggregation arises because any ex post temptation to disaggregate and reveal particularly favorable news in one segment entails revealing unfavorable news in another segment. A desire to balance profits across segments then leads a firm to disclose firmwide information (a temptation that cannot be avoided), but only in the aggregate. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/4.toc

The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns / Anil Arya in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 8 (Août 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 8 (Août 2011) . - pp. 1424-1437 Titre : The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Anil Arya, Auteur ; Brian Mittendorf, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1424-1437 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Aggregation  Career  concerns  Group  performance  measures Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper considers the desirability of aggregate performance measures in light of the fact that many individuals' performance incentives are driven by a desire to shape external perceptions (and thus future pay). In contrast to the case of explicit incentive contracts, we find that when individuals' actions are driven by career incentives, an aggregate measure (e.g., group or team output) can sometimes alleviate moral hazard concerns and improve efficiency. Aggregation intermingles performance measures that may be differentially affected by skill and effort of many agents. When such entanglement increases the prospect that the external market will attribute an employee's effort-driven contribution to transferable skills, the employee exerts higher effort as a means of posturing to the market. The incentive benefit of aggregation is weighed against the incentive cost because of information loss. Information loss from aggregation can reduce the market's reliance on the measure and thus diminish agents' desire to undertake effort to influence the measure. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/8.toc [article] The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns [texte imprimé] / Anil Arya, Auteur ; Brian Mittendorf, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1424-1437. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 8 (Août 2011) . - pp. 1424-1437 Mots-clés : Aggregation  Career  concerns  Group  performance  measures Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper considers the desirability of aggregate performance measures in light of the fact that many individuals' performance incentives are driven by a desire to shape external perceptions (and thus future pay). In contrast to the case of explicit incentive contracts, we find that when individuals' actions are driven by career incentives, an aggregate measure (e.g., group or team output) can sometimes alleviate moral hazard concerns and improve efficiency. Aggregation intermingles performance measures that may be differentially affected by skill and effort of many agents. When such entanglement increases the prospect that the external market will attribute an employee's effort-driven contribution to transferable skills, the employee exerts higher effort as a means of posturing to the market. The incentive benefit of aggregation is weighed against the incentive cost because of information loss. Information loss from aggregation can reduce the market's reliance on the measure and thus diminish agents' desire to undertake effort to influence the measure. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/8.toc