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Détail de l'auteur
Auteur J. Miguel Villas-Boas
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur
Affiner la rechercheOptimal search for product information / Fernando Branco in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 11 (Novembre 2012)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) . - pp. 2037-2056
Titre : Optimal search for product information Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Fernando Branco, Auteur ; Monic Sun, Auteur ; J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 2037-2056 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Marketing Pricing Search costs Information Learning Résumé : Consumers often need to search for product information before making purchase decisions. We consider a tractable (continuous-time) model of gradual learning, in which consumers incur search costs to learn further product information, and update their expected utility of the product at each search occasion. We characterize the optimal stopping rules for either purchase, or no purchase, as a function of search costs and of the importance/informativeness of each attribute. This paper also characterizes how the likelihood of purchase changes with the ex ante expected utility, search costs, and the importance/informativeness of each attribute. We discuss optimal pricing, the impact of consumer search on profits and social welfare, and how the seller chooses its price to strategically affect the extent of the consumers' search behavior. We show that lower search costs can hurt the consumer because the seller may then choose to charge higher prices. Discounting creates asymmetry in the purchase and no-purchase search thresholds, and may lead to lower prices if search occurs in equilibrium, or higher prices if there is no search in equilibrium. This paper also considers searching for signals of the value of the product, heterogeneous importance of attributes, endogenous intensity of search, and social learning. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/11/2037.abstract [article] Optimal search for product information [texte imprimé] / Fernando Branco, Auteur ; Monic Sun, Auteur ; J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 2037-2056.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) . - pp. 2037-2056
Mots-clés : Marketing Pricing Search costs Information Learning Résumé : Consumers often need to search for product information before making purchase decisions. We consider a tractable (continuous-time) model of gradual learning, in which consumers incur search costs to learn further product information, and update their expected utility of the product at each search occasion. We characterize the optimal stopping rules for either purchase, or no purchase, as a function of search costs and of the importance/informativeness of each attribute. This paper also characterizes how the likelihood of purchase changes with the ex ante expected utility, search costs, and the importance/informativeness of each attribute. We discuss optimal pricing, the impact of consumer search on profits and social welfare, and how the seller chooses its price to strategically affect the extent of the consumers' search behavior. We show that lower search costs can hurt the consumer because the seller may then choose to charge higher prices. Discounting creates asymmetry in the purchase and no-purchase search thresholds, and may lead to lower prices if search occurs in equilibrium, or higher prices if there is no search in equilibrium. This paper also considers searching for signals of the value of the product, heterogeneous importance of attributes, endogenous intensity of search, and social learning. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/11/2037.abstract Strategic entry before demand takes off / Qiaowei Shen in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 8 (Août 2010)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 8 (Août 2010) . - pp. 1259-1271
Titre : Strategic entry before demand takes off Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Qiaowei Shen, Auteur ; J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 1259-1271 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Industry dynamics Strategic entry Competition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : In developing industries, firms have to decide whether and when to enter the market depending on the state of demand, existing firms in the industry, and the firm's capabilities. This paper investigates a model of increasing demand, in which firms decide when to enter the market anticipating the strategic behavior of other potential entrants, and the effects of entry on future potential entrants. This paper shows that the ability of early entry to deter future competitors' entry leads firms to enter the market at a rate faster than demand is expanding. If there is the potential for many firms to enter the market, firms may be less likely to enter because of future competitor entry to correct any market opportunities. If firms enter the market depending on their fixed capabilities rather than depending on the firm's circumstances at each moment in time, firms end up entering the market at a faster rate in the early periods. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/8.toc [article] Strategic entry before demand takes off [texte imprimé] / Qiaowei Shen, Auteur ; J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 1259-1271.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 8 (Août 2010) . - pp. 1259-1271
Mots-clés : Industry dynamics Strategic entry Competition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : In developing industries, firms have to decide whether and when to enter the market depending on the state of demand, existing firms in the industry, and the firm's capabilities. This paper investigates a model of increasing demand, in which firms decide when to enter the market anticipating the strategic behavior of other potential entrants, and the effects of entry on future potential entrants. This paper shows that the ability of early entry to deter future competitors' entry leads firms to enter the market at a rate faster than demand is expanding. If there is the potential for many firms to enter the market, firms may be less likely to enter because of future competitor entry to correct any market opportunities. If firms enter the market depending on their fixed capabilities rather than depending on the firm's circumstances at each moment in time, firms end up entering the market at a faster rate in the early periods. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/8.toc