The auditor's slippery slope / Carlos Corona in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) . - pp. 924-937 Titre : The auditor's slippery slope : An analysis of reputational incentives Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Carlos Corona, Auteur ; Ramandeep S. Randhawa, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 924-937 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Reputation Auditing Game theory Sequential equilibrium Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Reputational concerns have commonly been perceived to have a positive effect on auditing firms' execution of their monitoring and attesting functions. This paper demonstrates that this need not always be the case by studying a two-period game of repeated interaction between a manager and an auditor under the assessment of the market for audit services. Regarding reputation as the sole motivator for the auditor, we illustrate how reputational concerns induce an auditing firm to misreport. We investigate the reasons and circumstances under which such misreporting takes place. In particular, a strategic manager can induce the audit firm down a slippery slope, wherein the managerial fraud increases as the tenure of the audit firm progresses, whereas the auditor's fraud reporting probability decreases. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/6.toc [article] The auditor's slippery slope : An analysis of reputational incentives [texte imprimé] / Carlos Corona, Auteur ; Ramandeep S. Randhawa, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 924-937. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) . - pp. 924-937 Mots-clés : Reputation Auditing Game theory Sequential equilibrium Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Reputational concerns have commonly been perceived to have a positive effect on auditing firms' execution of their monitoring and attesting functions. This paper demonstrates that this need not always be the case by studying a two-period game of repeated interaction between a manager and an auditor under the assessment of the market for audit services. Regarding reputation as the sole motivator for the auditor, we illustrate how reputational concerns induce an auditing firm to misreport. We investigate the reasons and circumstances under which such misreporting takes place. In particular, a strategic manager can induce the audit firm down a slippery slope, wherein the managerial fraud increases as the tenure of the audit firm progresses, whereas the auditor's fraud reporting probability decreases. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/6.toc

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