Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination / Harish Krishnan in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 141-147 Titre : Inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Harish Krishnan, Auteur ; Ralph A. Winter, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 141-147 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply  chain  coordination  Inventory  dynamics  Price  and  inventory  competition  Contracts Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting. A manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates. We show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions. When the product is highly perishable, retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories. Vertical price floors or inventory buybacks (subsidies for unsold inventory) can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions. When the product is less perishable, the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc [article] Inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination [texte imprimé] / Harish Krishnan, Auteur ; Ralph A. Winter, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 141-147. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 141-147 Mots-clés : Supply  chain  coordination  Inventory  dynamics  Price  and  inventory  competition  Contracts Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting. A manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates. We show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions. When the product is highly perishable, retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories. Vertical price floors or inventory buybacks (subsidies for unsold inventory) can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions. When the product is less perishable, the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc

Quick response and retailer effort / Harish Krishnan in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) . - pp. 962-977 Titre : Quick response and retailer effort Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Harish Krishnan, Auteur ; Roman Kapuscinski, Auteur ; David A. Butz, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 962-977 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Quick  response  Sales  effort  Supply  chain  incentives  Supply  chain  contracts  Exclusive  dealing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The benefits of supply chain innovations such as quick response (QR) have been extensively investigated. This paper highlights a potentially damaging impact of QR on retailer effort. By lowering downstream inventories, QR may compromise retailer incentives to exert sales effort on a manufacturer's product and may lead instead to greater sales effort on a competing product. Manufacturer-initiated quick response can therefore backfire, leading to lower sales of the manufacturer's product and, in some cases, to higher sales of a competing product. Evidence from case studies and interviews shows that some manufacturers view high retailer inventory as a means of increasing retailer commitment (“a loaded customer is a loyal customer”). By implication, manufacturers should recognize the effect we highlight in this paper: the potential of QR to lessen retailer sales effort. We show that relatively simple distribution contracts such as minimum-take contracts, advance-purchase discounts, and exclusive dealing, when adopted in conjunction with QR, can remedy the distortionary impact of QR on retailers' incentives. In two recent antitrust cases we find evidence that, consistent with our theory, manufacturers adopted exclusive dealing at almost the same time that they were making QR-type supply chain improvements. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/6.toc [article] Quick response and retailer effort [texte imprimé] / Harish Krishnan, Auteur ; Roman Kapuscinski, Auteur ; David A. Butz, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 962-977. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 6 (Juin 2010) . - pp. 962-977 Mots-clés : Quick  response  Sales  effort  Supply  chain  incentives  Supply  chain  contracts  Exclusive  dealing Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : The benefits of supply chain innovations such as quick response (QR) have been extensively investigated. This paper highlights a potentially damaging impact of QR on retailer effort. By lowering downstream inventories, QR may compromise retailer incentives to exert sales effort on a manufacturer's product and may lead instead to greater sales effort on a competing product. Manufacturer-initiated quick response can therefore backfire, leading to lower sales of the manufacturer's product and, in some cases, to higher sales of a competing product. Evidence from case studies and interviews shows that some manufacturers view high retailer inventory as a means of increasing retailer commitment (“a loaded customer is a loyal customer”). By implication, manufacturers should recognize the effect we highlight in this paper: the potential of QR to lessen retailer sales effort. We show that relatively simple distribution contracts such as minimum-take contracts, advance-purchase discounts, and exclusive dealing, when adopted in conjunction with QR, can remedy the distortionary impact of QR on retailers' incentives. In two recent antitrust cases we find evidence that, consistent with our theory, manufacturers adopted exclusive dealing at almost the same time that they were making QR-type supply chain improvements. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/6.toc