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Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain / Gérard P. Cachon in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 571-589 Titre : Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain : On contractual form and coordination Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Gürhan A. Kök, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 571-589 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Contracting  Competition  Retailing  Wholesale-price  contract  Quantity  discount  Two-part  tariff Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc [article] Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain : On contractual form and coordination [texte imprimé] / Gérard P. Cachon, Auteur ; Gürhan A. Kök, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 571-589. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 3 (Mars 2010) . - pp. 571-589 Mots-clés : Contracting  Competition  Retailing  Wholesale-price  contract  Quantity  discount  Two-part  tariff Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/3.toc

Optimal and competitive assortments with endogenous pricing under hierarchical consumer choice models / Gürhan A. Kök in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 9 (Septembre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 9 (Septembre 2011) . - pp. 1546-1563 Titre : Optimal and competitive assortments with endogenous pricing under hierarchical consumer choice models Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Gürhan A. Kök, Auteur ; Yi Xu, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1546-1563 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Assortment  planning  Product  variety  Category  management  Pricing  Inventory  costs  Nested  multinomial  logit  model Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies assortment planning and pricing for a product category with heterogeneous product types from two brands. We model consumer choice using the nested multinomial logit framework with two different hierarchical structures: a brand-primary model in which consumers choose a brand first, then a product type in the chosen brand, and a type-primary model in which consumers choose a product type first, then a brand within that product type. We consider a centralized regime that finds the optimal solution for the whole category and a decentralized regime that finds a competitive equilibrium between two brands. We find that optimal and competitive assortments and prices have quite distinctive properties across different models. Specifically, with the brand-primary model, both the optimal and the competitive assortments for each brand consist of the most popular product types from the brand. With the type-primary choice model, the optimal and the competitive assortments for each brand may not always consist of the most popular product types of the brand. Instead, the overall assortment in the category consists of a set of most popular product types. The price of a product under the centralized regime can be characterized by a sum of a markup that is constant across all products and brands, its procurement cost, and its marginal operational cost, implying a lower price for more popular products. The markup may be different for each brand and product type under the decentralized regime, implying a higher price for brands with a larger market share. These properties of the assortments and prices can be used as effective guidelines for managers to identify and price the best assortments and to rule out nonoptimal assortments. Our results suggest that to offer the right set of products and prices, category and/or brand managers should create an assortment planning process that is aligned with the hierarchical choice process consumers commonly follow to make purchasing decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/9.toc [article] Optimal and competitive assortments with endogenous pricing under hierarchical consumer choice models [texte imprimé] / Gürhan A. Kök, Auteur ; Yi Xu, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1546-1563. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 9 (Septembre 2011) . - pp. 1546-1563 Mots-clés : Assortment  planning  Product  variety  Category  management  Pricing  Inventory  costs  Nested  multinomial  logit  model Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies assortment planning and pricing for a product category with heterogeneous product types from two brands. We model consumer choice using the nested multinomial logit framework with two different hierarchical structures: a brand-primary model in which consumers choose a brand first, then a product type in the chosen brand, and a type-primary model in which consumers choose a product type first, then a brand within that product type. We consider a centralized regime that finds the optimal solution for the whole category and a decentralized regime that finds a competitive equilibrium between two brands. We find that optimal and competitive assortments and prices have quite distinctive properties across different models. Specifically, with the brand-primary model, both the optimal and the competitive assortments for each brand consist of the most popular product types from the brand. With the type-primary choice model, the optimal and the competitive assortments for each brand may not always consist of the most popular product types of the brand. Instead, the overall assortment in the category consists of a set of most popular product types. The price of a product under the centralized regime can be characterized by a sum of a markup that is constant across all products and brands, its procurement cost, and its marginal operational cost, implying a lower price for more popular products. The markup may be different for each brand and product type under the decentralized regime, implying a higher price for brands with a larger market share. These properties of the assortments and prices can be used as effective guidelines for managers to identify and price the best assortments and to rule out nonoptimal assortments. Our results suggest that to offer the right set of products and prices, category and/or brand managers should create an assortment planning process that is aligned with the hierarchical choice process consumers commonly follow to make purchasing decisions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/9.toc