The interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit / Richard Makadok in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 2 (Fevrier 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 2 (Fevrier 2010) . - pp. 356-372 Titre : The interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit : Why the whole Is less than the sum of the parts Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Richard Makadok, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 356-372 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Business strategy Competitive advantage Rivalry Collusion Industrial organization economics Horizontal differentiation Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Rivalry-restraint-based theoretical mechanisms predict that an industry's profits will increase when its firms engage in less price competition, or less direct competition, with each other. Competitive-advantage-based theoretical mechanisms predict that a firm's profits will increase when it creates superior economic value that direct and indirect competitors cannot fully compete away. But what is the interaction effect on profit of simultaneously restraining rivalry and increasing competitive advantage? Do they positively amplify/reinforce each other, or negatively dampen/undermine each other? This paper's theoretical model predicts a negative interaction effect, with potentially significant implications for theory, practice, and pedagogy. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/2.toc [article] The interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit : Why the whole Is less than the sum of the parts [texte imprimé] / Richard Makadok, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 356-372. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 2 (Fevrier 2010) . - pp. 356-372 Mots-clés : Business strategy Competitive advantage Rivalry Collusion Industrial organization economics Horizontal differentiation Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Rivalry-restraint-based theoretical mechanisms predict that an industry's profits will increase when its firms engage in less price competition, or less direct competition, with each other. Competitive-advantage-based theoretical mechanisms predict that a firm's profits will increase when it creates superior economic value that direct and indirect competitors cannot fully compete away. But what is the interaction effect on profit of simultaneously restraining rivalry and increasing competitive advantage? Do they positively amplify/reinforce each other, or negatively dampen/undermine each other? This paper's theoretical model predicts a negative interaction effect, with potentially significant implications for theory, practice, and pedagogy. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/2.toc

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