Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Modeling bounded rationality in capacity allocation games with the quantal response equilibrium / Yefen Chen in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1952-1962 Titre : Modeling bounded rationality in capacity allocation games with the quantal response equilibrium Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Yefen Chen, Auteur ; Xuanming Su, Auteur ; Xiaobo Zhao, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1952-1962 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Bounded  rationality  Capacity  allocation  Supply  chain  Quantal  response  equilibrium  Nash  equilibrium Résumé : We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically, and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects motivated by financial incentives. We find that the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that players are perfectly rational, substantially exaggerates retailers' tendency to strategically order more than they need. We propose a model of bounded rationality based on the quantal response equilibrium, in which players are not perfect optimizers and they face uncertainty in their opponents' actions. We structurally estimate model parameters using the maximum-likelihood method. Our results confirm that retailers exhibit bounded rationality, become more rational through repeated game play, but may not converge to perfect rationality as assumed by the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we consider several alternative behavioral theories and show that they do not explain our experimental data as well as our bounded rationality model. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/10/1952.abstract [article] Modeling bounded rationality in capacity allocation games with the quantal response equilibrium [texte imprimé] / Yefen Chen, Auteur ; Xuanming Su, Auteur ; Xiaobo Zhao, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1952-1962. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1952-1962 Mots-clés : Bounded  rationality  Capacity  allocation  Supply  chain  Quantal  response  equilibrium  Nash  equilibrium Résumé : We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically, and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects motivated by financial incentives. We find that the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that players are perfectly rational, substantially exaggerates retailers' tendency to strategically order more than they need. We propose a model of bounded rationality based on the quantal response equilibrium, in which players are not perfect optimizers and they face uncertainty in their opponents' actions. We structurally estimate model parameters using the maximum-likelihood method. Our results confirm that retailers exhibit bounded rationality, become more rational through repeated game play, but may not converge to perfect rationality as assumed by the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we consider several alternative behavioral theories and show that they do not explain our experimental data as well as our bounded rationality model. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/10/1952.abstract

Optimal pricing with speculators and strategic consumers / Xuanming Su in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 25-40 Titre : Optimal pricing with speculators and strategic consumers Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Xuanming Su, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 25-40 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Dynamic  pricing  Speculation  Resale  Strategic  customer  behavior  Competition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies a monopolist firm selling a fixed capacity. The firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved. Speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale, which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high. Consumers may strategically choose when to purchase, and they may also choose to purchase from the firm or from the speculators. We characterize equilibrium prices and profits and analyze the long-run capacity decisions of the firm. There are three major findings. First, the presence of speculators increases the firm's expected profits even though the resale market competes with the firm. Second, by facilitating resale, the firm can mimic dynamic pricing outcomes and enjoy the associated benefits while charging a fixed price. Third, speculative behavior may generate incentives for the seller to artificially restrict supply, and thus may lead to lower capacity investments. We also explore several model extensions that highlight the robustness of our results. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc [article] Optimal pricing with speculators and strategic consumers [texte imprimé] / Xuanming Su, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 25-40. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 25-40 Mots-clés : Dynamic  pricing  Speculation  Resale  Strategic  customer  behavior  Competition Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper studies a monopolist firm selling a fixed capacity. The firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved. Speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale, which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high. Consumers may strategically choose when to purchase, and they may also choose to purchase from the firm or from the speculators. We characterize equilibrium prices and profits and analyze the long-run capacity decisions of the firm. There are three major findings. First, the presence of speculators increases the firm's expected profits even though the resale market competes with the firm. Second, by facilitating resale, the firm can mimic dynamic pricing outcomes and enjoy the associated benefits while charging a fixed price. Third, speculative behavior may generate incentives for the seller to artificially restrict supply, and thus may lead to lower capacity investments. We also explore several model extensions that highlight the robustness of our results. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc