Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Another hidden cost of incentives / Andreas Fuster in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 57-70 Titre : Another hidden cost of incentives : The detrimental effect on norm enforcement Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Andreas Fuster, Auteur ; Stephan Meier, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 57-70 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Public  goods  Prosocial  behavior  Norm  enforcement  Hidden  cost  of  incentives  Experimental  economics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Monetary incentives, such as subsidies or bonuses, are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of private contribution incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how (centrally provided) private incentives interact with (decentralized) punishment, both of which affect subjects' monetary payoffs. The results of our experiment show that private incentives for contributors can reduce the effectiveness of the norm enforcement mechanism: Free riders are punished less harshly in the treatment with incentives, and as a consequence, average contributions to the public good are no higher than without incentives. This finding ties to and extends previous research on settings in which monetary incentives may fail to have the desired effect. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc [article] Another hidden cost of incentives : The detrimental effect on norm enforcement [texte imprimé] / Andreas Fuster, Auteur ; Stephan Meier, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 57-70. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 57-70 Mots-clés : Public  goods  Prosocial  behavior  Norm  enforcement  Hidden  cost  of  incentives  Experimental  economics Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Monetary incentives, such as subsidies or bonuses, are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of private contribution incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how (centrally provided) private incentives interact with (decentralized) punishment, both of which affect subjects' monetary payoffs. The results of our experiment show that private incentives for contributors can reduce the effectiveness of the norm enforcement mechanism: Free riders are punished less harshly in the treatment with incentives, and as a consequence, average contributions to the public good are no higher than without incentives. This finding ties to and extends previous research on settings in which monetary incentives may fail to have the desired effect. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc

Competition between organizational groups / Lorenz Goette in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 948-960 Titre : Competition between organizational groups : Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Lorenz Goette, Auteur ; David Huffman, Auteur ; Stephan Meier, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 948-960 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Group  decisions  Cooperation  Punishment  Experiment  Army Résumé : Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/948.abstract [article] Competition between organizational groups : Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations [texte imprimé] / Lorenz Goette, Auteur ; David Huffman, Auteur ; Stephan Meier, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 948-960. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 948-960 Mots-clés : Group  decisions  Cooperation  Punishment  Experiment  Army Résumé : Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/948.abstract