Inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination / Harish Krishnan in Management science, Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 141-147 Titre : Inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Harish Krishnan, Auteur ; Ralph A. Winter, Auteur Année de publication : 2010 Article en page(s) : pp. 141-147 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Supply chain coordination Inventory dynamics Price and inventory competition Contracts Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting. A manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates. We show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions. When the product is highly perishable, retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories. Vertical price floors or inventory buybacks (subsidies for unsold inventory) can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions. When the product is less perishable, the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc [article] Inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination [texte imprimé] / Harish Krishnan, Auteur ; Ralph A. Winter, Auteur . - 2010 . - pp. 141-147. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 56 N° 1 (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 141-147 Mots-clés : Supply chain coordination Inventory dynamics Price and inventory competition Contracts Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting. A manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates. We show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions. When the product is highly perishable, retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories. Vertical price floors or inventory buybacks (subsidies for unsold inventory) can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions. When the product is less perishable, the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/56/1.toc

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