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On channel coordination under price-dependent revenue-sharing / J-M. Chen in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 62 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 62 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1992–2001 Titre : On channel coordination under price-dependent revenue-sharing : can eBay's fee structure coordinate the channel? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : J-M. Chen, Auteur ; H-L. Cheng, Auteur ; I-C. Lin, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 1992–2001 Note générale : Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Decision  analysis  Game  theory  Inventory  Channel  coordination  Revenue-sharing Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : This article deals with the problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under consignment contracts with a price-dependent revenue-sharing (R-S) function. We consider the retailer being a channel leader who offers the vendor a leave-it-or-take-it contract, and the vendor being a price-setting firm who sells the one-of-a-kind goods through the exclusive channel. Under such a setting, the retailer decides on the term of R-S contract, and the vendor determines the retail price of the product. For each item sold, the retailer deducts an agreed-upon percentage from the price and remits the balance to the vendor. We model the decision-making of the two firms as a Stackelberg game, and carry out equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel with consideration of three kinds of contracts: the fixed, the price-increasing, and the price-decreasing R-S percentage. Our analysis reveals that the contract with a price-decreasing R-S function, for example, the fee structure adopted by eBay.com, performs worse than the others. It persists in a consistent bias: the price-decreasing R-S induces the vendor to choose a higher price, and the retailer tends to receive a lower R-S percentage, which leads to less demand quantity, less profit, and channel inefficiency. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v62/n11/abs/jors2010174a.html [article] On channel coordination under price-dependent revenue-sharing : can eBay's fee structure coordinate the channel? [texte imprimé] / J-M. Chen, Auteur ; H-L. Cheng, Auteur ; I-C. Lin, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 1992–2001. Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 62 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1992–2001 Mots-clés : Decision  analysis  Game  theory  Inventory  Channel  coordination  Revenue-sharing Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : This article deals with the problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under consignment contracts with a price-dependent revenue-sharing (R-S) function. We consider the retailer being a channel leader who offers the vendor a leave-it-or-take-it contract, and the vendor being a price-setting firm who sells the one-of-a-kind goods through the exclusive channel. Under such a setting, the retailer decides on the term of R-S contract, and the vendor determines the retail price of the product. For each item sold, the retailer deducts an agreed-upon percentage from the price and remits the balance to the vendor. We model the decision-making of the two firms as a Stackelberg game, and carry out equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel with consideration of three kinds of contracts: the fixed, the price-increasing, and the price-decreasing R-S percentage. Our analysis reveals that the contract with a price-decreasing R-S function, for example, the fee structure adopted by eBay.com, performs worse than the others. It persists in a consistent bias: the price-decreasing R-S induces the vendor to choose a higher price, and the retailer tends to receive a lower R-S percentage, which leads to less demand quantity, less profit, and channel inefficiency. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v62/n11/abs/jors2010174a.html