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Tournaments without prizes / Jordi Blanes I Vidal in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) . - pp. 1721-1736 Titre : Tournaments without prizes : Evidence from personnel records Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Jordi Blanes I Vidal, Auteur ; Mareike Nossol, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1721-1736 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Tournaments  Relative  concerns  Status  concerns  Relative  performance  feedback  Relative  performance  evaluation Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance. The setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where, for exogenous reasons, management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity. We find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long-lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers' incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/10/1721.abstract [article] Tournaments without prizes : Evidence from personnel records [texte imprimé] / Jordi Blanes I Vidal, Auteur ; Mareike Nossol, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1721-1736. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) . - pp. 1721-1736 Mots-clés : Tournaments  Relative  concerns  Status  concerns  Relative  performance  feedback  Relative  performance  evaluation Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance. The setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where, for exogenous reasons, management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity. We find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long-lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers' incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/10/1721.abstract