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Détail de l'auteur
Auteur Olivier L'Haridon
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur
Affiner la rechercheExperienced vs. described uncertainty / Mohammed Abdellaoui in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) . - pp. 1879-1895
Titre : Experienced vs. described uncertainty : Do we need two prospect theory specifications? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Mohammed Abdellaoui, Auteur ; Olivier L'Haridon, Auteur ; Corina Paraschiv, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1879-1895 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Experience-based decisions Description-based decisions Rare events Risk Uncertainty Prospect theory Utility Loss aversion Decision weights Probability weighting Source of uncertainty Ambiguity Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper reports on the results of an experimental elicitation at the individual level of all prospect theory components (i.e., utility, loss aversion, and weighting functions) in two decision contexts: situations where alternatives are described as probability distributions and situations where the decision maker must experience unknown probability distributions through sampling before choice. For description-based decisions, our results are fully consistent with prospect theory's empirical findings under risk. Furthermore, no significant differences are detected across contexts as regards utility and loss aversion. Whereas decision weights exhibit similar qualitative properties across contexts typically found under prospect theory, our data suggest that, for gains at least, the subjective treatment of uncertainty in experience-based and description-based decisions is significantly different. More specifically, we observe a less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities and a more pronounced underweighting of moderate and high probabilities for experience-based decisions. On the contrary, for losses, no significant differences were observed in the evaluation of prospects across contexts. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/10/1879.abstract [article] Experienced vs. described uncertainty : Do we need two prospect theory specifications? [texte imprimé] / Mohammed Abdellaoui, Auteur ; Olivier L'Haridon, Auteur ; Corina Paraschiv, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1879-1895.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 10 (Octobre 2011) . - pp. 1879-1895
Mots-clés : Experience-based decisions Description-based decisions Rare events Risk Uncertainty Prospect theory Utility Loss aversion Decision weights Probability weighting Source of uncertainty Ambiguity Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : This paper reports on the results of an experimental elicitation at the individual level of all prospect theory components (i.e., utility, loss aversion, and weighting functions) in two decision contexts: situations where alternatives are described as probability distributions and situations where the decision maker must experience unknown probability distributions through sampling before choice. For description-based decisions, our results are fully consistent with prospect theory's empirical findings under risk. Furthermore, no significant differences are detected across contexts as regards utility and loss aversion. Whereas decision weights exhibit similar qualitative properties across contexts typically found under prospect theory, our data suggest that, for gains at least, the subjective treatment of uncertainty in experience-based and description-based decisions is significantly different. More specifically, we observe a less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities and a more pronounced underweighting of moderate and high probabilities for experience-based decisions. On the contrary, for losses, no significant differences were observed in the evaluation of prospects across contexts. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/10/1879.abstract