Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Competing matchmakers / Tanjim Hossain in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1913-1925 Titre : Competing matchmakers : An experimental analysis Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Tanjim Hossain, Auteur ; Dylan Minor, Auteur ; John Morgan, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1913-1925 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Platform  competition  Two-sided  markets  Monopoly  E-commerce Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically suffer from equilibrium multiplicity—platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically differentiated, we find that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more efficient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally differentiated, so there is no single efficient platform, we find strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1913.abstract [article] Competing matchmakers : An experimental analysis [texte imprimé] / Tanjim Hossain, Auteur ; Dylan Minor, Auteur ; John Morgan, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1913-1925. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1913-1925 Mots-clés : Platform  competition  Two-sided  markets  Monopoly  E-commerce Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically suffer from equilibrium multiplicity—platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically differentiated, we find that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more efficient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally differentiated, so there is no single efficient platform, we find strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1913.abstract

The behavioralist visits the factory / Tanjim Hossain in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 2151-2167 Titre : The behavioralist visits the factory : Increasing productivity using simple framing manipulations Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Tanjim Hossain, Auteur ; John A. List, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 2151-2167 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Framing  effect  Natural  field  experiment  Worker  productivity  Loss  aversion Résumé : Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets. Such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments—a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts. We provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility. Our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research—framing manipulations—in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility. Using a natural field experiment, we report several insights. For example, conditional incentives framed as both “losses” and “gains” increase productivity for both individuals and teams. In addition, teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains. The magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1%: that is, total team productivity is enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation. Importantly, we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time; rather, the effects are observed over the entire sample period. Moreover, we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/12/2151.abstract [article] The behavioralist visits the factory : Increasing productivity using simple framing manipulations [texte imprimé] / Tanjim Hossain, Auteur ; John A. List, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 2151-2167. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 2151-2167 Mots-clés : Framing  effect  Natural  field  experiment  Worker  productivity  Loss  aversion Résumé : Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets. Such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments—a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts. We provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility. Our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research—framing manipulations—in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility. Using a natural field experiment, we report several insights. For example, conditional incentives framed as both “losses” and “gains” increase productivity for both individuals and teams. In addition, teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains. The magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1%: that is, total team productivity is enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation. Importantly, we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time; rather, the effects are observed over the entire sample period. Moreover, we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/12/2151.abstract